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Dear  Members,  Colleagues  and  Interested 
Parties,
Let us assume an unusual perspective and pose 
the question: What are capital markets from 
a purely linguistic point of view? What are 
their emotional connotations? A trite ques-
tion, without political-economic significance? 
By no means. For many important argumen-
tative battles are publicly fought, and often 
won, on the back of the fear of, for example, 
altered ownership structures among German 
firms. Let us remember the frequently cited 
necessity of protecting important firms from 
being attacked by hedge funds, or from being 
taken over by foreign competitors. Whereas it 
was primarily banks and stock exchanges that 
were putting forward this argument until re-
cently, today automobile manufacturers are 
falling victim to this campaign of fear.
This is a campaign and not a fact because 
there is no scientific evidence for the dangers 
mentioned. Let us take the example of “short-
term orientation”, a characteristic of invest-
ment funds and a supposed sign that the fund 
in question is not really interested in the wel-
fare of the firm. In fact the intended holding 
period of a share is unrelated to the length of 
the investment horizon that determines the 
market price of the share. Even a short-term 
investor can only make a profit if she is able 
to find a new investor the next morning, who 
is willing to buy her stock for a higher price 
– which in fact requires the buyer to be con-
vinced of the lasting success of the company. 
The capital market and its innate long-term 
orientation  provides  for  both  the  increased 
value of the firm and the speculator‘s profit.
And what about the interests of the employ-
ees, the interest in protecting jobs and income 
earned from employment? The capital mar-
kets can also offer a vision here: the vision of 
co-ownership. The key to capital-supported 
employee co-determination may be found in 
pension funds. Such funds collect the savings 
capital of employees, bundle it and acquire 
shares in large and small firms on the mar-
ket. Some funds demand and receive a seat on 
the supervisory board - a capital-backed and 
adequate form of co-determination. With the 
positive  side-effect  that  the  increased  val-
ue of the firm, whether this is demonstrated 
by higher wages or higher profits, ultimate-
ly lands in the pockets of present and future 
pensioners. 
This is one reason why financial economists 
are pushing so strongly for a sustained expan-
sion of capital markets and for a changeover 
to capital-based provision for old age. The 
Center for Financial Studies will deal with 
the issues of the development of the capital 
market even more in the future. This is ex-
emplified by Michael Haliassos‘ research pro-
gram  on  “Household  Wealth  Management” 
(see this newsletter), by a new research proj-
ect on banking structures in Germany, and by 
collaborating in the construction of a new Fi-
nancial Center Monitor for Germany, led by 
the Land Hessia. We will cover the results of 
these and related  research in future editions 
of this newsletter and in our working paper 
series  (www.ifk-cfs.de/English/homepages/
h-cfsworkingpaper.htm),  to  contribute  to  a 
realistic view of the capital markets in the 
general public debate. 
Best greetings,
Jan P. Krahnen (CFS Director)
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New CFS Research Program:  
Insurance and Risk Transfer
The aim of this program area is to contribute to our understanding of the objectives 
and the implications of risk transfer between (re-)insurers, banks, corporations, and 
markets. Regulation (e.g., Basel II, Solvency II), the development of new risk transfer 
methods (e.g., credit derivatives, asset backed securities, cat bonds, captives etc.) and 
the awareness of the need to actively manage risk and to integrate risk management 
with other areas of the firm, such as real investment, capital structure, and organiza-
tional decisions, require a broad perspective in pursuing the agenda. Our research thus 
combines the areas of insurance and risk management, corporate finance and banking, 
as well as organization. 
Research will be conducted within the 
framework  of  international  collabora-
tions. Beyond the presentation and pub-
lication of the obtained research results 
we also wish to initiate a dialogue with 
researchers,  practitioners,  and  regula-
tors through CFSseminars, workshops and 
conferences.
Research will focus on two main areas: 
•  Alternative Risk Transfer 
•  Integrated Risk Management 
Alternative Risk Transfer 
Work  in  this  area  will  be  concerned 
with the investigation of alternative risk 
transfer techniques as used by banks, in-
surers, and corporations such as cred-
it  derivatives,  asset-backed  securities, 
multi-line insurance, and cat bonds. We 
analyze the structural and economic dif-
ferences between alternative methods of 
transferring and retaining risk and how 
their use affects the real economic activ-
ities of market participants. 
Integrated Risk Management
Work in this area integrates the choice 
of alternative methods of risk transfer, 
real  investment  projects,  and  capital 
structure.  Firms  can  retain  or  trans-
fer risk. Retaining risk (self insurance) 
can be facilitated by adjusting the capi-
tal  structure  or  through  the  use  of  a 
captive. Risk can be transferred using 
insurance, derivatives, subsidiaries and 
special purpose vehicles combined with 
limited liability, special contractual ar-
rangements with customers and suppli-
ers etc. We analyze firms‘ reasons for   
transferring  and  retaining  risk,  what 
methods of risk transfer they use, and 
how they organize the risk management 
process. 
Christian  Laux  and  Achim  Wambach 
organized  a  CFSresearch  conference  on 
“Risk  Transfer  between  (Re)Insurers, 
Banks, and Markets” as a kick-off meet-
ing for this program area. The confer-
ence brought together some of the most 
renowned researchers in this area, in-
cluding, among many others, Franklin 
Allen (Wharton School), Ron Ander-
son (London School of Economics), Da-
vid Cummins (Wharton School), Neil 
Doherty  (Wharton  School),  Günter 
Franke  (Universität  Konstanz),  and 
Martin  Hellwig  (Max  Planck  Insti-
tute, Bonn).
A first set of research in this program 
area deals with the benefit of index or 
parametric triggers in the presence of 
adverse selection and the role of insur-
ance brokers.
In the paper “ART Versus Reinsurance: 
The Disciplining Effect of Information 
Insensitivity”  Silke  Brandts  (Bain  & 
Company)  and  Christian  Laux  sug-
gest a novel benefit of “Alternative Risk 
Transfer” (ART) products with paramet-
ric or index triggers. When a reinsurer 
has private information about his client‘s 
risk, outside reinsurers will price their 
reinsurance offer less aggressively. Out-
siders  are  subject  to  adverse  selection 
as only a high-risk insurer might find it 
optimal to change reinsurers. This cre-
ates a hold-up problem that allows the 
incumbent  to  extract  an  information 
rent.  An  information-insensitive  ART 
product with a parametric or index trig-
ger is not subject to adverse selection. It 
can therefore be used to compete against 
an  informed  reinsurer,  thereby  reduc-
ing the premium that a low-risk insurer 
has to pay for the indemnity contract. 
However, ART products exhibit an in-
teresting fate in our model as they are 
useful, but not used in equilibrium be-
cause  of  basis-risk.  The  research  was 
presented  and  discussed  at  the  CFSre-
Program Director 
•   Christian Laux (University of 
Frankfurt and CFS)
Fellows
•   Alexander Mürmann (Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania) 
•   Achim Wambach (Universität  
Erlangen-Nürnberg) 3
search conference “Risk Transfer between 
(Re)Insurers, Banks, and Markets”, the 
Global Finance Conference in Dublin, 
as well as at the annual meetings of the 
German  Finance  Association  in  Augs-
burg and the Financial Management As-
sociation in Milan.
In  the  paper  “Insuring  the  Uninsur-
able: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance 
Contracts” Neil Doherty and Alexan-
der Mürmann (both Wharton School) 
show how insurance markets can pro-
vide  an  orderly  mechanism  by  which 
policy holders can receive transfers for 
losses that are non-verifiable and, possi-
bly, were never anticipated when cover-
age was written. Examples include the 
asbestos claims that have cost the insur-
ance industry tens of billions of dollars, 
the sudden appearance of toxic mold in 
insurer claims, various forms of “cyber 
loss”, and possibly the 9/11 losses which, 
despite the war exclusion on many poli-
cies, were not disputed by insurers and 
reinsurers.  The  authors  propose  that 
brokers play a central role in extending 
insurance markets to cover non-verifi-
able losses. It is normal for brokers to 
“own the renewal rights” on the book 
of business they place with the insur-
er. This means that the broker is free to 
recommend to its clients that they re-
new with the current insurer or switch 
to a rival. Indeed, the insurer revokes 
any right to directly solicit any business 
placed  through  the  broker.  This  pro-
vision  vests  the  broker  with  consider-
able hold-up power that leads to more 
complete  insurance  markets.  The  re-
search  was  presented  and  discussed  at 
the CFSresearch conference “Risk Transfer 
between (Re)Insurers, Banks, and Mar-
kets”, the Risk Theory Society meeting, 
the  Insurance,  Mathematics  and  Eco-
nomics Congress, the World Risk and 
Insurance Economics Congress, as well 
as at the Wharton School and the Uni-
versity of Ulm.
Both  contributions  are  available  as 
CFSworking  papers  (www.ifk-cfs.de/
English/homepages/h-veroeffentli-
chungen.htm)
Christian Laux   
(University of Frankfurt and CFS)
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In the context of this program, coordina-
ted by Michael Haliassos (University of 
Frankfurt and CFS), a team of scientists 
collaborate in the program area “Hou-
sehold  Wealth  Management”  and  stu-
dy the way in which households decide 
which assets to hold, how often to trade 
them, what proportion of their wealth 
to devote to each asset, how to finance 
their spending through borrowing, and 
how to combine assets of various types 
and riskiness with debts. They also look 
at the macro implications of such port-
folio choices, for issues such as the dis-
tribution of wealth or the financing of 
retirement in the face of the demogra-
phic transition. 
Research  is  conducted  within  the  fra-
mework of international collaborations 
with  researchers  from  universities  and 
central banks. A formal channel through 
which many of these interactions are ef-
fected is the Research Training Network 
on the Economics of Ageing in Europe 
(AGE), sponsored by the European Uni-
on. The  CFSresearch  program  was  laun-
ched with a May 2005 conference of this 
network (see page 22 of this CFSnewslet-
ter), co-sponsored by CFS. 
In particular three topics are in the focus 
of interest:
General Equilibrium  
Effects of Increased Asset 
Market Participation
Studies  the  consequences  of  the 
spread of equity culture and of ris-
ky asset holding more broadly 
Risky  assets,  such  as  stocks,  are  held 
by pools of heterogeneous households. 
Households are self-selected into these 
pools according to certain characteris-
tics that make them more or less likely 
to participate in the risky asset. As the 
participation margin spreads, we would 
expect  the  demographic  composition 
of the participant pool to change. This 
New CFS Research Program:  
Household Wealth Management
 
The past two decades have witnessed increased 
participation of households in a broader ran-
ge  of  risky  assets  than  before,  including  both 
financial  and  real  assets,  as  well  as  increased 
participation in consumer debt, including un-
collateralized credit card debt. Increased invol-
vement in assets arose mainly because of asset 
price upswings in the 1990s; because of the de-
mographic transition that is forcing households 
to save more for retirement; and because of government policies related 
either to privatization or to the provision of tax incentives, so that people 
participate in newly established individual retirement saving schemes. 4
can  have  important  consequences  for 
how the stock market and other risky 
asset markets operate, e.g., in terms of 
volatility or in terms of total demand. 
The composition of non-participants al-
so changes, correspondingly. Both pools 
(participants and those not participating 
yet) are relevant for financial practitio-
ners, who are interested both in how the 
market behaves, and in how to attract 
further customers. The market practices 
of the changing participant pool are al-
so  relevant  for  observed  consequences 
of  spreading  participation  in  terms  of 
wealth distribution and of asset returns.  
Credit Card Debt 
Studies the portfolio composition of 
households that revolve credit card 
debt. 
Households have been observed in the 
data to revolve high-interest credit card 
debt, but accumulate at the same time 
substantial assets for retirement. More-
over, they have been observed to accu-
mulate  substantial  liquid  assets  at  low 
interest  rates  which  could  have  been 
used to pay off high-interest credit card 
debt. These and other portfolio peculi-
arities of credit card debt revolvers are 
difficult to explain with our usual mo-
dels of borrowing behavior and call for 
a deeper analysis of the psychology of 
credit or debit card holders and how this 
impacts on their economic behavior. 
Economics of Ageing
Studies issues arising from the demo-
graphic transition in Europe and the 
United States towards a larger popu-
lation share of aging households.  
This research is carried out in interac-
tion with the other nodes of the AGE 
Research  Training  Network,  including 
IFS/UCL, Tilburg, Mannheim, DELTA, 
Salerno,  Venice,  Copenhagen,  RAND, 
and Banca d‘Italia. It focuses on issues of 
saving and portfolios, health, and retire-
ment  choices  of  an  ageing  population, 
including adequacy of assets and other 
provisions  for  retirement  in  European 
countries and in the US.  
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Program Director
•   Michael Haliassos (University of Frank-
furt and CFS)
Fellows
•   Yannis Bilias (University of Cyprus)
•   Christopher Carroll (Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity)
•   Dimitris Georgarakos (University of 
Frankfurt)
•   Luigi Guiso (Ente per gli studi monetary, 
bancari e finanziari “Luigi Einaudi”)
•   Tullio Jappelli (University of Salerno)
•   Nicholas Souleles (Wharton School, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania)
Collaborators
•   Carol C. Bertaut (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System)
•   Michael Reiter (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
The following CFSworking papers offer 
some first results:
•   Y. Bilias, D. Georgarakos, M. Haliassos 
(2005): Equity Culture and the Distribution 
of Wealth (CFSworking paper No. 20).
•   C. D. Carroll (2005): The Method of 
Endogenous Gridpoints for Solving Dy-
namic Stochastic Optimization Problems 
(CFSworking paper No. 18). 
On Forecasting Exchange Rates
 
by CFS Program Director Michael Binder (University of Frankfurt and CFS)
As weary as economists are of seeing their research being evaluated on the basis of the 
performance of the forecasts that their models imply, there is nevertheless considerable 
agreement that the hallmark of the best empirical macroeconomic research is that it can 
be helpful in both understanding the consequences of policy changes and in forecasting 
the probability distribution of future macroeconomic outcomes.
In few areas have economists historically performed as poorly at forecasting as in fore-
casting nominal exchange rates. Rogoff (2002), for example, likened the profession’s un-
successful efforts at forecasting major currency exchange rate movements to (old day) 
weather forecasting in the army, where a general supposedly told his weather forecas-
ting team: “I appreciate being informed that your forecasts are no better than random, but keep sending them 
on, as the army needs your predictions for planning purposes.”
Two immediate questions arise: Is it actually critical to have high quality exchange rate forecasts? And: If the tale 
about weather forecasting in the army is an age-old one, why is it still appropriate for today‘s state-of-the-art ex-
change rate forecasting? In other words:  Why have economists attempting to predict exchange rate movements 
not been able to match the advances in weather forecasting made by meteorologists?5
The first question – as to why it is critical to have good ex-
change rate forecasts – can be answered quite readily. There is a 
wide range of decision problems for which exchange rate fore-
casting is central. Among the most immediate ones are at the 
microeconomic level the decision problems of individual inves-
tors considering to purchase/sell foreign currency denomina-
ted assets. Among the macroeconomic decision problems for 
which exchange rate forecasting is central are monetary policy 
decisions based on (implicit or explicit) inflation targeting.
The second question – as to why economists forecasting ex-
change rates have not been able to match the advances in wea-
ther forecasting made by meteorologists – is a good bit more 
subtle to answer. In this article, I will describe current state-of-
the-art methods for exchange rate forecasting as well as some 
of the efforts of the CFS research team in International Econo-
mics to improve exchange rate forecasting. At the end of the ar-
ticle I will return to the issue of possible lessons we might draw 
from the success of meteorologists. It will be best, though, to 
start by briefly outlining the four main forecasting models that 
currently tend to be employed by currency forecasters.
One class of exchange rate forecasts are “random walk” fore-
casts. Underlying these forecasts is the idea that all contem-
poraneously available information about future exchange rate 
movements is reflected in the current value of the exchange 
rate, and that all future events leading to future exchange ra-
te movements are purely random from the perspective of to-
day. The best forecast of the exchange rate at any future date is 
then today’s value. While “random walk” forecasts are probab-
ly the simplest forecasts one might imagine and generally have 
as poor a forecasting performance as any non-expert hearing 
about the idea for the first time would conjecture, “random 
walk” forecasts of the fluctuations of major currencies have in 
practice been rather hard to beat. See, for example, Sarno and 
Taylor (2002) for a more detailed discussion of this.
A second class of exchange rate forecasts is attempting to link 
predicted future exchange rate movements with predicted fu-
ture movements in certain key macroeconomic variables. This 
sounds simple enough, but why should there be a predictab-
le component in the future movements of key macroecono-
mic variables that in turn would also affect the exchange rate? 
Even casual observers of the global economic environment are 
aware that there are regularly sizeable imbalances in both the 
distribution of saving and asset holdings and of relative pri-
ces across countries. It stands to reason that such imbalances 
will eventually be corrected and will then lead to adjustments 
in nominal exchange rates. Thus the second class of exchange 
rate forecasting models aims to capture the equilibrium rela-
tions between the exchange rate and certain key macroecono-
mic variables. These equilibrium relations also include parity 
relations such as purchasing power parity (predicting nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations to offset movements in countries‘ 
relative prices) or covered interest parity (predicting exchange 
rate fluctuations to offset movements in countries‘ real inte-
rest rate differentials). While of considerable macroeconomic 
appeal, exchange rate forecasting in this second class of fore-
casts has been quite underwhelming in performance, to put it 
mildly still, except possibly on a very long-term basis for speci-
fic pairs of currencies. Should this dismal performance be sur-
prising? Upon a little reflection, it will become apparent that 
the pitfalls of this second class of forecasting models are to be 
found in the detail: Using - as has typically been the case - ma-
croeconomic aggregates available at monthly or quarterly fre-
quencies only, it would actually be quite surprising to be able 
to predict exchange rate fluctuations on a weekly or even dai-
ly basis. Furthermore, many of the equilibrium relations that 
macroeconomic theory suggests are long-term equilibria. Im-
balances in, say, the distribution of saving and asset holdings 
across countries do typically take a considerable period of time 
to result in correction. Whether and when equilibrium relati-
ons that are suggested by macroeconomic theory are reflected 
in actual exchange rate data will also depend on certain fea-
tures of the overall macroeconomic environment. Deviations 
from purchasing power parity, for example, are sufficiently 
costly only when there are continued and/or very large price 
changes. In the jargon of economists, then, we should think of 
equilibrium relations mattering possibly only conditionally on 
the state of the macroeconomic environment. The state of the 
macroeconomic environment itself varies over time, and key 
variables which matter today (such as gross flows of financial 
capital) may have played no more than a very limited role in the 
past. Thus, it is a very subtle and challenging task to determi-
ne the proper macroeconomic equilibrium relations that mat-
ter for forecasting a specific exchange rate series at a specific 
point in time. Broad-brush approaches should not be expected 
to yield quality exchange rate forecasts.
A third class of exchange rate forecasts is based on linking ex-
change rate fluctuations to insights about price determination 
in financial markets from microeconomic theory. Trade on fo-
reign exchange markets obviously is not only related to news 
about macroeconomic variables, but also occurs after different 
types of private information have become available to some of 
the market participants. How these market participants will 
respond to this information is also likely to differ across par-
ticipants, depending on a broad range of characteristics of the 
participants. Not to be forgotten among the characteristics in-
fluencing market participants’ reaction to new information is 
the organizational structure of the market place that they are 
trading in. Lyons (2001) provides a quite detailed account of 
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the microstructure approach to exchange rate determination 
following these microeconomic theory considerations. While 
microstructure based empirical exchange rate models have so 
far not proved to consistently yield exchange rate forecasts of 
acceptable  accuracy,  some  microeconomic  variables  argued 
by this literature as being critical to exchange rate forecasting 
– specifically order flows – are nowadays much sought after 
when computing exchange rate forecasts.
The  fourth  and  final  class  of  state-of-the-art  exchange  rate 
forecasts are those based on “technical analysis”. Technical ana-
lysis models arrive at exchange rate forecasts by mechanically 
extrapolating past patterns of exchange rate fluctuations into 
the future. For these models to consistently yield high-quali-
ty forecasts, exchange rate fluctuations will need to occur in 
sufficiently frequent and regular up- and downswings. Under 
certain environments this may be the case, though likely not 
accidentally but as a function of the underlying macro- and mi-
croeconomic variables.
Forecasts of exchange rate fluctuations based on the second and 
third classes of approaches – linking future exchange rate fluc-
tuations to the dynamics of certain macro- and microeconomic 
market variables – have in most economic environments per-
formed rather poorly, and typically even poorer than “random 
walk” forecasts. The CFS research team in International Eco-
nomics has nevertheless set out to develop a framework for 
exchange rate forecasting that combines the second and third 
classes of approaches in a hybrid framework. Compared to ran-
dom walk and technical analysis forecasts, there is sound eco-
nomic reasoning underlying these two classes of approaches, 
and the lack of success to date in using the second and third 
classes of approaches is likely due to these approaches not ha-
ving been implemented yet in the proper conditional form. 
Within a hybrid framework, the CFS research team is paying 
specific attention to the following factors:
•   The equilibrium relations through which macro- and micro-
economic market variables matter for future exchange rate 
predictions are conditional on a wide range of factors cha-
racterizing the individual foreign exchange markets as well as 
the global economic environment. For example, in joint work 
with M. Hashem Pesaran at the University of Cambridge and 
Sunil Sharma at the International Monetary Fund (Binder, 
Pesaran and Sharma, 2005) I document how one of the key 
macroeconomic parity relations, purchasing power parity, is 
conditional on features of the global economic environment. 
This characterization requires a large cross-country data set 
containing sufficiently numerous observations on a wide ran-
ge of such environments, as well as novel econometric tech-
niques suitable for filtering such panel data sets‘ common 
features from idiosyncratic dynamics. It should not be unde-
restimated how challenging and time-intensive the task of do-
cumenting the major conditionalities central to exchange rate 
forecasting is.
•   As recently documented in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold 
and Vega  (2003),  working  with  high-frequency  databases 
measuring both economic news and corresponding exchange 
rate fluctuations has enormous potential. The CFS hybrid fra-
mework is therefore a mixed frequency model, aiming to be 
of relevance both for daily and weekly predictions as well as 
those that are of a more medium- to long-term nature (of se-
veral months or even years).
•   The formation of expectations by the participants in exchange 
rate markets is central to the transmission of the arrival of 
economic news to decision rationales. As too little is still 
known about this transmission, the CFS research team is pla-
cing great importance on advancing the use of survey expec-
tations for purposes of exchange rate determination. As there 
is only very insufficient data available on the evolution of ex-
pectations of foreign exchange market participants across dif-
ferent macro- and microeconomic environments, this part of 
the CFS work will also require primary data collection from 
cooperating market institutions.
It is precisely at this point then that we can return to the se-
cond of the two questions posed at the beginning of this article: 
Why have economists attempting to predict exchange rate mo-
vements not been able to match the advances in weather fore-
casting made by meteorologists? I would argue that if current 
efforts at CFS and elsewhere to improve upon the quality of 
exchange rate forecasting - inter alia through the collection of 
large data sets on the evolution of expectations of foreign ex-
change market participants - were given even a small fraction 
of the resources available to meteorologists for satellite-based 
data collection, then we would be on a much faster track to 
making Rogoff‘s (2002) age-old army tale an age-old tale with 
regard to exchange rate forecasting as well.
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The Monetary Policy Problem
The preferred policy instrument of ma-
ny  leading  central  banks,  including  the 
ECB, is a short-term nominal interest ra-
te. While  short-term  nominal  rates  are 
relatively easy to control, they are largely 
irrelevant for most economic decisions. 
Consumption  and  investment  decisions, 
for example, seem to be driven by medi-
um to long term interest rates (and many 
other factors). Interpreting long rates as 
the compound of future short rates shows 
that  economic  decisions  are  driven  by 
both current and expected future policy 
decisions. Furthermore, what matters for 
private sector decisions is the real interest 
rate, which requires subtracting expected 
inflation from the nominal interest rate. 
The  previous  observations  imply  that 
monetary  policy  must  use  the  short-
term nominal rate to affect the long-
term real interest rate. This is relatively 
straightforward: For any level of expec-
ted inflation the desired real interest ra-
te can be implemented by choosing an 
appropriate path for the future short-
term  nominal  interest  rate. There  is, 
however,  one  exception. When  nomi-
nal interest rates are low already, po-
licy  might  not  be  able  to  prevent  an 
increase  in  real  interest  rates  genera-
ted, for example, by a negative shock 
to expected inflation, because doing so 
might require setting short-term nomi-
nal interest rates below zero. Since ne-
gative nominal rates are not feasible, a 
drop in expected inflation can thus lead 
to undesirably high real interest rates. 
This  will  most  probably  depress  out-
put. The fall in output in turn will put 
downward pressure on prices and po-
tentially confirm the initial drop in ex-
pected inflation. The zero lower bound 
thus  generates  the  possibility  of  per-
manently  falling  prices,  zero  nominal 
interest rates, and low output levels, a 
situation typically referred to as a ‚li-
quidity trap‘.
Possible Solutions I: 
Interest Rate Policy
How can monetary policy deal with the 
constraint  that  nominal  interest  rates 
cannot fall below zero and the potential 
threat of a liquidity trap?
Imagine a situation similar to the one in 
the United States in January 2003: No-
minal interest rates are low but still above 
zero; economic activity is weak and cur-
rent and expected inflation rates subdued. 
Suppose additional adverse shocks hit the 
economy in such a situation. How should 
monetary policy react to these additio-
nal shocks? Should one keep the powder 
in the keg, i.e., react less strongly and sa-
ve some ‚ammunition‘ for the future, or 
should  one  aggressively  reduce  interest 
rates, possibly all the way to zero? 
Almost all research finds that a more ag-
gressive interest rate reduction is called 
for in response to adverse shocks, once 
nominal interest rates are in the vicinity 
of the zero lower bound. This conclusi-
on is reached for rather different reasons 
in a variety of models. Adam and Billi 
(2004a), for example, argue that agents 
understand that the lower bound possib-
ly constrains monetary policy in the fu-
ture. Additional  shocks  make  reaching 
the lower bound more likely and induce 
the private sector to reduce inflation ex-
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1    Views expressed represent exclusively the author‘s own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank.
2    Negative nominal rates imply that debtors have to pay back less than they borrowed. Since paper money offers a zero nominal return, credit supply by private agents is zero 
at negative nominal rates. 
Monetary Policy in a Low 
Inflation Environment
 
by CFS Fellow Klaus Adam (European Central Bank)1 
A secular decline in inflation and nominal interest rates has occurred in many industri-
alized economies over recent decades. Provided this drop in inflation is permanent, one 
should expect nominal interest rates to remain at low average levels for the foreseeable 
future.  Low values for the nominal interest rate, however, generate their own specific 
problems. In particular, they increase the likelihood that monetary policy is unable to 
reduce nominal rates as much as desired because nominal interest rates cannot fall be-
low zero.2 
In this essay I summarize the findings of academic literature and of my own research 
studying  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  in  an  environment  where  the  zero  lower 
bound on nominal interest rates is potentially relevant. I first discuss the policy problem generated by the lower 
bound and then present some of the solutions that have been suggested.8
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pectations. This increases the perceived 
real interest rates and amplifies the ini-
tial shock. To counteract the amplification, 
monetary policy should react more aggres-
sively than usual. Similar results have been 
obtained in Reifschneider and Williams 
(2000) who study the FRB/US model and 
by Kato and Nishiyama (2004) and Or-
phanides and Wieland (2000) who em-
ploy small-scale stylized models.
Note that a more aggressive policy re-
sponse to negative shocks might bring 
about zero nominal interest rates ear-
lier than a policy that would react slug-
gishly to additional shocks. The fact that 
the zero lower bound is reached, howe-
ver, is in itself not a sign of inappropria-
te policy but may instead simply reflect 
that policymakers reacted with the ap-
propriate vigor to a sequence of adver-
se shocks. 
Now  suppose  that  despite  vigorous 
easing,  the  situation  has  deteriorated 
further  and  short-term  nominal  inte-
rest rates have reached their zero lower 
bound. This  generates  a  new  situation 
that has been extensively discussed in li-
terature, e.g., Krugman (1998), Jung 
et  al.  (2001),  or  Eggertsson  and 
Woodford (2003). The basic conclusi-
on obtained is that policy can still effect 
economic outcomes, because what mat-
ters for economic decisions is a longer-
term real interest rate rather than the 
short-term nominal rate. The long-term 
real rate can still be affected by policy 
even  if  short-term  nominal  rates  can-
not be lowered any further. Policyma-
kers can, for example, make (binding) 
announcements on how they intend to 
conduct short-term nominal interest ra-
te policy in the future3.  To the extent that 
these announcements are credible, they 
will affect longer-term nominal rates and 
thereby  the  corresponding  real  interest 
rates. In particular, the economic litera-
ture suggests that in a liquidity trap poli-
cy should promise to raise interest rates 
rather slowly and to tolerate in the futu-
re, for a limited time span, an inflation ra-
te that lies above the usual target values. 
Low nominal rates in the future and high-
er expected inflation will both reduce the 
real long-term interest rate and help the 
economy out of the liquidity trap. Quan-
titative studies for the U.S. economy, e.g., 
Adam and Billi (2004a) or Reifschnei-
der and Williams (2000), suggest that 
this policy approach is quite effective.
An important precondition for the pre-
vious approach to work is that the private 
sector believes the central bank announce-
ments about the conduct of future mone-
tary policy, i.e., it requires central bank 
credibility.  Credibility  is  important  be-
cause once the economy has left the li-
quidity  trap,  the  central  bank  loses  its 
interest in letting inflation increase abo-
ve the usual target values, as initially pro-
mised.  Quantitative  studies  show  that 
if the private sector anticipates that the 
central bank will renege on its announce-
ments, the welfare costs generated by the 
zero lower bound increase markedly, e.g., 
Adam and Billi (2004b). 
A number of contributions have inves-
tigated how a non-credible central bank 
might (re)gain the required credibility in 
a situation with zero nominal interest ra-
tes. No simple solutions seem to be avai-
lable. Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson 
(2003)  argue  that  monetary  policyma-
kers care about reducing the real level of 
government debt because of the tax dis-
tortions associated with having to serve 
the  debt.  Increasing  public  debt  levels 
may therefore generate an incentive to 
deliver on the promised inflation rate. 
The experience in Japan, however, casts 
doubts on the relevance of this proposal. 
Svensson  and  Jeanne  (2004)  suggest 
engineering a change in the central bank 
balance sheet that would imply negative 
net worth, should the central bank re-
nege on the announced excess inflation 
rates or increase nominal interest rates 
faster than initially indicated. The diffi-
culties likely to be associated with both 
of these proposals highlight the impor-
tance of having gained credibility before 
the economy has reached the zero lower 
bound, e.g., by having delivered in a ti-
mely and accurate fashion on promised 
policy goals in the past.
Possible Solutions II:  
‘Unorthodox Monetary   
Policies’ and other 
Instruments
Besides  interest  rate  policy,  literature 
discusses a range of alternative policy in-
struments for getting out of a liquidity 
trap (or avoiding it altogether). These are 
briefly discussed in this section.
Quantitative easing policies, i.e., policies 
that increase the stock of money via open 
market operations, have repeatedly been 
suggested as an alternative to interest ra-
te policy when short-term nominal rates 
have reached the zero lower bound, e.g., 
Orphanides and Wieland (2000). The 
quantitative impact of such easing poli-
cies is difficult to estimate and theoretical 
considerations suggest that their impact 
is possibly zero: In a liquidity trap open 
market operations exchange one zero re-
turn  asset  (money)  for  another  (bonds 
of various maturities). Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) provide forceful addi-
tional arguments as to why other ‘unor-
thodox’ monetary policy measures, e.g., 
the purchase of real assets by the central 
bank, may be equally ineffective for esca-
ping a liquidity trap.
The  use  of  exchange  rate  policies  has 
been  advocated  by  Svensson  (2003), 
who  suggests  implementing  a  signifi-
cant  devaluation  followed  by  a  peg  at 
3  The Bank of Japan has recently made a commitment of this sort by stating conditions that have to be fulfilled before it considers abandoning its zero interest rate policy. 9
the depreciated exchange rate. Curren-
cy depreciation  stimulates the economy 
directly by giving a boost to export- and 
import-competing  sectors.  More  im-
portantly,  however,  a  depreciated  ex-
change rate implies a higher price level 
in the future, provided purchasing po-
wer parity adjustments occur. Exchange 
rate depreciation may therefore induce 
private-sector expectations of a higher 
future price level and create the desirab-
le long-term inflation expectations that 
are a crucial element of escaping from 
the liquidity trap. However, as is the ca-
se with interest rate policy, credibility 
to maintain the peg is crucial for this 
policy approach to work: Once inflati-
on has become positive there are again 
strong incentives to allow for an appre-
ciation of the currency. Moreover, the 
tacit consent of major trading partners 
is likely to be a prerequisite, as such po-
licies might have non-negligible beggar-
thy-neighbor effects, e.g., Coenen and 
Wieland (2003).
Fiscal policy provides further instruments 
that are potentially useful for escaping a 
liquidity trap but has received attention 
only relatively recently. Auerbach and 
Obstfeld  (2004)  propose  a  scheduled 
increase  in  consumption  taxes,  that  is 
intended  to  induce  agents  to  anticipa-
te consumption purchases. Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2004) consider a model 
where taxes have supply side effects on-
ly and find that a temporary increase in 
taxes increases inflation rates and helps 
to generate the desired inflation expec-
tations. Overall, the academic literature 
analyzing the role of fiscal policy in a li-
quidity trap is still in its infancy.
Conclusions
Even if short-term nominal interest rates 
have fallen all the way to zero, monetary 
policy is far from being ineffective: Mo-
netary policy can still influence longer-
term  real  interest  rates,  which  matter 
most for economic decisions. Engaging 
in credible promises about the conduct 
of future policy allows the generation of 
inflationary expectations that lower re-
al interest rates and help the economy 
to escape the liquidity trap. Yet, without 
central bank credibility such a policy is 
not feasible. Credibility is therefore key 
for a central bank that seeks to success-
fully operate in a low inflation environ-
ment where nominal interest rates are 
low on average and might occasionally 
come close to zero.
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Bank Regulation and Capital Holdings
 
by Elena Carletti (CFS post-doc researcher)
Broadly speaking, banks can be defined as institutions granting long-term loans and re-
ceiving short-term deposits from the public. Because of the maturity mismatch between 
assets and liabilities, and given the strong information content of their assets, banks are 
exposed to crises, affecting both individual institutions and the system as a whole. 
The concern for a stable banking system, together with that for the protection of con-
sumers/depositors, provides the motivation for numerous special regulations and su-
pervisory activities in the banking sector, as well as safety net arrangements in the 
form of deposit insurance and lender of last resort facilities. 
Over time minimum capital requirements have become the most important way of regulating banks. Their main 
role is that of assuring banks are managed in a safe and sound manner. Given the existence of deposit insurance, 
banks have easy access to deposit funds. If they do not have any capital, banks have an incentive to take on exces-
sive risk. If the risk investments pay off, their shareholders receive the payoff. If the investments fail, the losses 
are borne either by depositors or by shareholders. Forcing banks to hold capital should then reduce their in-
centive to take risks as it shifts some of the losses onto shareholders. But because equity capital is typically more 
costly than other forms of funding, banks try to minimize its use. This is why there is a need for regulation im-
posing minimum capital requirements. The prime examples are the Basle accords and the widespread adoption 
of these rules in many countries. 
One important question is how effective is capital regulation. 
Despite the lively debate accompanying the new Basle accord, 
in practice banks’ capital holdings seem to be much higher than 
the regulatory minimum. Moreover, they seem to have varied 
over time independently of the regulatory changes. For examp-
le, capital ratios at US banks declined from around 40-50% in 
the 1840s to 6-8% in the 1940s, a level at which they remained 
till the end of the 1980s (Berger et al., 1995). More recently, 
US banks have again increased their capital holdings, reaching a 
level that is 75% in excess of the regulatory minimum (Flanne-
ry and Rangan, 2004). Similarly, most European banks now 
have excess capital, with tier 1 ratios significantly about target 
(Citigroup, 2005). 
Why do we observe these fluctuations in banks’ capital hol-
dings? Do they serve any point if they are not binding? Given 
that capital adequacy standards were not in existence during 
much of the nineteenth century, and have not fluctuated much 11
since their inception, it is hard to find a regulatory rationale to 
explain movements in banks’ capital holdings. 
In a recent paper with Franklin Allen from the University 
of Pennsylvania and Robert Marquez from the University of 
Maryland (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2005), we propose 
a new explanation of banks’ capital holdings and capital regu-
lation. Our starting point is to incorporate two important fea-
tures of the banking industry into a model of capital regulation. 
First, we recognize that banks’ capital structures may have im-
plications for their ability to attract clients (and in particular 
borrowers). Second, we consider that banks perform an im-
portant role as providers of funds and producers of informati-
on to the firms and investment projects they finance. As already 
mentioned at the beginning, this is one of the basic functions 
banks perform in the economy.
In such a context, we find that even if raising capital is costly, 
banks may not minimize on the amount of capital they hold, 
implying that capital requirements need not be binding if banks 
operate in a competitive market. Specifically, when banks have 
to compete to attract borrowers (that is, when credit markets 
are very competitive), they have an incentive to hold capital as 
one way of committing themselves to monitoring firms and in-
creasing the value of the investment projects they finance. In 
fact, the more capital banks hold, the greater the losses banks’ 
owners will face if loans are not repaid, and thus the greater the 
banks’ incentive to monitor firms. Given that capital is costly, 
however, banks may not be able to hold the amount of capital 
firms would like them to hold. In such a case, firms may want 
to provide further incentives – through the interest rate on lo-
ans – for banks to monitor them. That is, firms may want to fo-
rego part of their revenues and offer higher loan rates to banks 
in exchange for greater monitoring. This result leads us to con-
clude that market discipline can be imposed not only from the 
liability side, as has been stressed in the literature on the use 
of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side of banks’ ba-
lance sheets.
If the competitiveness of credit markets requires banks to hold 
capital to attract borrowers, capital regulation might not be 
binding. A regulator (maximizing social welfare) will in general 
choose a different level of capital than that obtained in the mar-
ket equilibrium. And in particular when the cost of capital is 
high relative to the cost of deposits, capital regulation will imp-
ly minimum requirements that are below the amount the mar-
ket will require. The reason for this is that firms do not fully 
internalize the cost of capital for banks, and therefore require 
high amounts of capital as a way for banks to commit themsel-
ves to monitoring. Then, any capital requirement set by a re-
gulator would not be binding, and competition for borrowers 
would lead to banks holding greater amounts of capital than is 
socially optimal. 
The implications of our analysis are consistent with some re-
cent empirical facts, including the capital buildup of banks in a 
period like the 1990s when the competitiveness of the credit 
markets seems to have increased substantially. Moreover, we 
should observe market disciplining stemming from the asset 
side of banks’ balance sheets, as Kim et al. (2005) find in the 
context of Norway. Finally, concerning firms’ sources of funds, 
our analysis predicts that bank monitoring is of greater value 
to firms with high internal agency problems, that is to firms 
whose managers’ and shareholders’ interests diverge. By cont-
rast, firms where monitoring adds little value should prefer to 
borrow from an arm’s length source of financing. If capitaliza-
tion improves lenders’ rating and reputation, these results are 
consistent with the finding in Billet et al. (1995) that lenders’ 
“identity”, in the sense of their credit rating, is important in de-
termining the market’s reaction to loan announcements. 
Overall, our analysis puts forth a new motivation for banks’ 
capital holdings, which is consistent with the possibility that 
banks hold capital in excess of the minimum regulatory re-
quirements despite such capital being more costly than depo-
sits. Understanding the relationship between capital holdings 
and bank regulation is essential to understanding the role of ca-
pital regulation and the effectiveness of the current regulatory 
apparatus. There is still need for further research, both theore-
tical and empirical, on this important policy issue. 
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After  the  great  success  of  last  year`s 
conference “Capital Markets In the 
Long Term: Demography, Economic 
Development and Funded Pension 
Systems” jointly organized by Allianz 
Group and the Center for Financial Stu-
dies we are pleased to present you today 
the reader.
The focus of the discussion at the con-
ference on September 23, 2004 was on 
the long-term impact on capital mar-
kets and pension systems. The speakers 
tried to identify the direction and ma-
gnitude of potential changes as well as 
the likelihood of an eventual asset melt-
down.
The conference‘s objective was to com-
bine insights from academia with those 
from the financial community in order 
to provide a more comprehensive out-
look on capital market developments.
If  you  wish  to  receive  book  “Capi-
tal  Markets  In  the  Long  Term:  De-
mography, Economic Development and 
Funded Pension Systems”, please let us 
know.
We have a limited number, we can send 
out for free. Please mail your request 
to: media_contact@ifk-cfs.de
CFSconference readers
“Capital Markets In the Long Term: Demography,  
Economic Development and Funded Pension Systems”13
XXII 
XXI 
In  the  monographs 
at issue the years of 
rapid  industrial  ex-
pansion  and  crisis 
between  1871  and 
1875 are empirical-
ly examined, along with the ensuing 
period up to the World War I. On the basis 
of selected aspects, the author investigates 
the question of whether, from its infancy 
and over time, a development from a less 
efficient to an efficient and fully integrated 
market can be observed. At the same time 
the applicability of selected aspects of mod-
ern capital market theory regarding prices 
on the primary and secondary stock mar-
kets between 1871 and 1914 is examined. 
The  historical  market  index  HIMAX 
1871-1914 forms the basis of the em-
pirical analysis of the period of rapid in-
dustrial expansion. This share index was 
calculated in conjunction with the work 
at issue on the basis of data collected on 
six German stock exchanges, in the form 
of both a price and performance index. 
On the basis of the HIMAX 1871-1914 
it is possible not only to empirically ana-
lyze the first era of “German capital mar-
ket history”, but also to fill the index gap 
which  existed  between  the  year  1876 
and the foundation year of the Deutsches 
Reich. The established database makes it 
possible for this work and other future in-
vestigations to carry out long-term anal-
ysis of the monthly development of the 
German stock market from its beginnings 
up to the outbreak of the World War I.
ISBN 3-8314-2616-3,  © 2005 by  Fritz 
Knapp Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main
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The German Capital Market Before World War I - Years of Rapid Industrial Expansion, 
Crisis and the Efficiency of the German Stock Market up to 1914
After her studies of Communication Sciences in France, Anja Weigt (née Wodrich) took a Busi-
ness degree at the University of Frankfurt in 1997, with Credit and Financing, Economics IT 
and Economic French as her focal subjects. From 1998 to 2001 she worked as a Researcher at 
the Center for Financial Studies in Frankfurt. Since 2004 she has been working for an interna-
tional PR agency in the field of Corporate and Financial Communications.
For a long time the 
German stock mar-
ket and the venture 
capital market we-
re regarded as un-
derdeveloped, particularly in comparison 
with the Anglo-American markets. In the 
mid-1990s,  however,  there  were  clear 
signs of an increase in the significance of 
equity financing in general and in the fi-
nancing by venture capitalists of young, 
innovative growth companies in particu-
lar. At the same time as the Neuer Markt, 
the market segment for growth companies 
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, an IPO 
boom  was  triggered;  supply  of  and  de-
mand for venture capital rose significantly. 
This work outlines the development of the 
German stock and venture capital markets 
over the last 60 years and analyzes what 
prevented such a development for so long, 
and what then made it possible.
Furthermore, within the framework of 
the CFS Monograph XXII and based on 
an extensive set of data, all the IPO-com-
panies on the Neuer Markt and all parties 
involved in the IPOs will be examined, 
applying  modern  option-price  theory 
and statistical procedures, with particular 
emphasis on the following three aspects: 
a) The proceeds of the issue in compari-
son with its direct and indirect costs, fo-
cusing on the costs of underpricing and 
greenshoes, b) the certification function 
of venture capitalists and issuing banks 
at the time of the IPO and c) the longer-
term performance of companies financed 
by  venture  capital  in  comparison  with 
those not financed by venture capital. 
The  findings  of  this  work  are  interes-
ting  and  informative,  partly  because   
they differ significantly from the findings 
of similar studies in the USA. For interes-
ted parties who would like to draw lessons 
from the collapse of the New Economy, 
the information contained in this mono-
graph  and its findings provide an indispen-
sable foundation for further analyses.
ISBN 3-8314-2615-5,  © 2005 by  Fritz 
Knapp Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main
Stefanie  A.  Franzke  graduated  in  Busi-
ness  Administration  from  the  University 
of Frankfurt. Her focal areas of study we-
re Credit and Finance, Marketing, Money, 
Currency and Foreign Trade. She has been a 
member of the CFS staff since 1998.
Venture Capital in Germany and the  
Neuer Markt: An Empirical Study14
On the occasion of the CFScol-
loquium on June 8, 2005 Chief 
Financial and Chief Risk Officer 
at Deutsche Bank AG, Clemens 
Börsig made the case for for-
ward  looking  management  of 
operational risk on both an in-
dividual risk and portfolio level. 
Due to Börsig, the weakness of 
the  current  discussion  is  that 
operational risk is mainly analyzed on an aggregated basis and 
from a historical viewpoint. The standards already achieved for 
the management of credit and market risk could easily be cre-
ated for the management of operational risk by orienting them 
towards the procedures used to control credit risk. 
In recent years operational risk for banks, i.e. losses incurred 
as a result of bank robberies for example, or due to computer 
failure or the misconduct of individual managers, has increased 
significantly. The discipline concerned with the management of 
this risk is, however, still in its infancy, Börsig emphasized. As 
a consequence of the new equity capital regulations from Ba-
sel II, banks will be obliged to support operational risk with 
equity capital in the future.  As a result of this the interest in 
the efficient management of this type of risk is increasing. Thus 
it is conceivable that a market for trading this type of risk will 
evolve in a similar way to that in which a liquid market for the 
trading of credit risk has come into being in recent years. There 
has always been operational risk in the banking business. Ho-
wever the amount of risk and the possible loss resulting from 
it has increased sharply. Examples are large-scale fraud in the 
field of online banking (phishing) and the risk posed by multi-
party lawsuits. The settlement of a lawsuit brought by World-
com shareholders cost Deutsche Bank $325 million.
According to Börsig, banks need a standardized process for the 
company as a whole in which data is systematically analyzed for 
underlying operational risk and quantified according to a stan-
dardized evaluation system. Furthermore this process should 
also include a binding cost/benefit analysis of possible risk-re-
ducing measures and a clear decision-making structure with 
regard to the acceptance of residual risk. The introduction of 
such a stringent process for operational risk represents virgin 
territory for the banks. However banks do have great experi-
ence of standardized evaluation processes and the consistent 
control of risk in the field of credit.   
Efficient management of operational risk requires the foresigh-
ted estimation of possible losses, in a similar way that the ma-
nagement of credit risk is linked to expected losses, according 
to Börsig. There are many challenges facing the development of 
such models. This is especially true for the category of operati-
onal risk where losses occur very rarely but are very large. Börsig 
cited the September 11 terrorist attacks on the financial center in 
New York as an example of this.
In spite of these difficulties Deutsche Bank has begun setting up 
databases and developing new management systems, the Chief 
Financial and Chief Risk Officer said. Initially a relatively simp-
le rating system for operational risk will be used. This system 
will then gradually be refined, as happened in the case of cre-
dit risk models.
Felizitas Thom (CFS staff)
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Basel II und die Konsequenzen für  
das Risikomanagement/Basel II and its  
Impact on Risk Management 
Forward Looking Management of Operational Risk
The management of operational risk should, in the opinion of Clemens Börsig, Chief Financial and Chief Risk Of-
ficer of Deutsche Bank AG, orient itself towards the procedure for controlling credit risk. According to Basel II, 
operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events.15
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The Stability of the Financial System is Strengthened by Basel II
In his speech at the CFScolloquium Edgar Meister, Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
stressed that Basel II has a positive effect on the stability of the financial system. The principle of national ac-
countability for supervision guarantees the necessary proximity of the supervisor to the institutions.
Edgar Meister regards the new 
standards  resulting  from  Basel 
II as an important milestone. At 
the CFScolloquium on May 11, 
2005 Meister chose risk in the 
financial  system  and  the  chal-
lenges for banking supervision 
and central banks as his central 
themes. In his opinion the fra-
mework for Basel II represents 
the result of negotiations that guarantee banks’ adequate pro-
vision of equity and set in motion important improvements in 
risk management. Thus the new standards have a positive effect 
on the stability of the financial system.
According to Meister, the high quality of national banking su-
pervision continues to form the basis of structural stability in 
the banking system. Moreover, the principle of national accoun-
tablity for supervision guarantees the necessary proximity of the 
supervisor to the institutions. Particularly in view of the conti-
nuing structural and legal differences from country to country, 
national banking supervision is the most satisfactory solution. 
Meister  emphasized  that  international  finance  and  banking 
markets had become extremely efficient. At the same time 
interconnection and integration of national financial systems 
have also increased in recent years. The high efficiency and dy-
namism of the financial markets could, however, also have a 
downside. Susceptability to disruption may increase as the risk 
of  contagion rises. Crises could thus spread more easily, as the 
financial crises in the 1990s showed. Meister advised against 
combating unsatisfactory developments in the financial mar-
kets with the general use of measures involving interest rates. 
In order to make a real difference, an increase in interest rates 
of such magnitude would be required which would have a tan-
gible effect on the development of the economy.
Meister regards the continually high oil price among other 
things as a potential danger for financial stability. It takes spen-
ding power away from the consumer and puts pressure on 
firms‘ profit margins and on the price development in the eco-
nomy as a whole. Imbalances in foreign trade such as the US 
current account deficit also pose risks. In the medium term 
there might occur shocks in this field.
Hedge funds increase the efficiency of markets and the whole 
financial system on the one hand. On the other hand their acti-
vities are very hidden, thus making it difficult for market par-
tipants and supervisory bodies to assess the risks to banks in 
relation to hedge funds and possible systematic risks. Because 
of the lack of supervision hedge funds would create vacuums 
in the domain of the supervisory authorities and which would 
spread out beyond it, according to Meister. Therefore it is im-
portant that hedge funds‘ counterparts, in particular the banks, 
keep a close watch on their risk and attempt to limit it.
On the whole, however, Meister regards the financial system as 
robust enough to be able to deal with any individual risks which 
might occur.          Felizitas Thom (CFS staff)
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The Euro: Ready for a Global Role?
Adam S. Posen, Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington  DC regards the Euro as 
a limited success. In his speech the editor of the book “The Euro at Five: Ready for a Global Role?” made four sug-
gestions as to how the Europeans can drive forward the international significance of the Euro.
The  basic  hypothesis  put  forward  by 
Adam S. Posen, Senior Fellow at the 
Institute for International Economics in 
Washington DC and editor of the book 
“The Euro at Five: Ready for a Global 
Role?”, is that the Euro has been a li-16
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mited success and offers Germany espe-
cially very little, both in a positive and a 
negative sense. In the CFSlecture on June 
15, 2005 he presented his assessment of 
the development of the Euro up to now 
and his forecast for the fledgling currency. 
He regards the significantly lower interest 
rates in many countries, for instance Italy, 
as one of the merits of the common cur-
rency. The integration of the European ca-
pital markets has also been given a boost. 
The introduction of the Euro has, howe-
ver, neither contributed to the pushing 
through of structural reforms in Europe, 
nor has it increased the discipline of the 
member states in the field of financial 
policy, Posen emphasized. According to 
Posen the hypothesis of the limited suc-
cess of the Euro is confirmed by looking 
at the worldwide distribution of curren-
cy reserves. The Euro comprises 19.7% 
of the reserves, slightly more than the 
share of the old German Mark, and signi-
ficantly less than that of the Dollar with 
63.9%. In the long term Posen expects 
the domination of the Dollar to fall, but 
does not expect the Euro to profit from 
this significantly. Posen expects the Ja-
panese currency above all to be among 
the winners.
Posen made four 
suggestions  as 
to  how  the  Eu-
ropeans can dri-
ve  forward  the 
significance  of 
the  Euro.  He 
called for a mo-
re wide-ranging integration of the Eu-
ropean financial markets together with 
a strengthening of supervision of the fi-
nancial markets. According to Posen the 
Europeans should pool their votes at the 
IMF, in order to strive towards a more 
important role in international moneta-
ry matters. A united Europe carries mo-
re weight than it needs and could even 
cede  votes  to Asian  countries  such  as 
China, not, of course, without asking for 
anything in return. 
Above all the stagnating economies in 
the big countries of the Eurozone could 
pick up speed by pursuing a more active 
macroeconomic policy and relaxing mo-
netary and financial policy. Posen called 
for a reduction in the key interest rate.
A financial policy which is intended to 
bring about prompt repayment of state 
deficits is not recommended by Posen for 
the Europeans. Even though such a poli-
cy worked in the USA in the late 1990s 
and later in Scandinavia, it has no imp-
lications  for  Europe,  Posen  explained. 
The lack of flexibility of the European 
economy does not allow a comparison 
with the USA. And Scandinavia, with its 
small, but very open economies, is a spe-
cial case which provides no lessons for 
Germany. Overall, Posen concluded that 
monetary policy alone does not guaran-
tee economic success. 
Felizitas Thom (CFS staff)
Fractal Eye Turns to the Behaviour of Financial Markets
“Risk Managers underestimate Risk”. In the opinion of Benoit Mandelbrot we all take more risk than we assume 
to do. This was the main statement of the CFSforum Mandelbrot held on May 17, 2005. As the originator of fractal 
geometry the Sterling Professor of Mathematical Science and IBM Fellow fights against the use of obviously mis-
leading models in financial risk management.
If someone builds an earthquake-proof 
tower, he says, the building should not 
only survive the average earthquake but 
the most powerful one imaginable in the 
area in question. In contrast, the typical 
models used to manage market risks in 
banks all assume the normal distributi-
on to describe the world - a distribution 
which has been proved only to be able 
to model the changes in market behavi-
or during normal times and which is al-
most useless to model extreme events. 
The only reason for this seems to be, that 
for the normal distribution almost every 
necessary result can be calculated ana-
lytically, while one has to use more time-
consuming and sophisticated numerical 
methods  like  Monte-Carlo-Simulation 
to derive the same results for more com-
plex distributions.
In “The (mis)behavior of financial mar-
kets”,  Mandelbrot‘s  latest  book,  the 
author recommends no longer using mo-
dels that are essentially based on the nor-
mal distribution, but turning to models 
that use different and maybe more rea-
listic  assumptions,  in  particular  fractal 
geometry, where parts of the world are 
assumed to be self-similar, and which he 
considers especially to describe the tail 
of any risk-related function better than 
the normal distribution. 
Mandelbrot does not claim that fractal 
models can make better predictions than 
others, but he assumes that with his mo-
dels it would be possible to analyze risks 
more deeply and one would be able to 
gain a fundamental understanding of the 
risks one is going to take. 
Christof Reese 
(CFS staff and Capgemini Deutschland GmbH)17
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The Joint Lunchtime Seminars Series are a series of weekly research 
lectures inviting academics from other institutions to present their re-
search in the fields of Monetary Economics, Macroeconomics, Finance 
and Econometrics. The speakers comprise both well-established senior 
researchers as well as those at the assistant and associate level from all 
over Europe and the United States.
Originally started in January 2001, the weekly presentations have be-
come a fixed entry in the diary of many members of research institutions 
and central banks located in Frankfurt. As a result, seminars are usually 
accompanied by lively debates and subsequent discussions.
The Joint Lunchtime Seminars are organized by Klaus Adam (European 
Central Bank), Heinz Herrmann/Sandra Eickmeier (Deutsche Bundes-
bank) and Volker Wieland (University of Frankfurt and CFS)/Günter 
Beck (University of Frankfurt).
 
Oct. 26, 2005    Evaluating the New Keynesian Phillips Curve: 
Evidence for Canada 
Stephen Murchison (Bank of Canada)
Oct. 19, 2005    Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange 
Luigi Guiso (University of Chicago)
Oct. 12, 2005    Firm Size Dynamics in the Aggregate  
Economy 
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (Stanford University)
Oct. 05, 2005    Loan Maturity, Borrower Risk and Asymmetric 
Information: Evidence from Lines of Credit to 
Small Businesses  
Fabiana Penas (University of Tilburg)
Sept. 28, 2005    Credit Market Competition and Capital 
Regulation  
Elena Carletti (Center for Financial Studies) 
Sept. 21, 2005    Monetary Policy with Single Instrument 
Feedback Rules   
Pedro Teles (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
Sept. 14, 2005    How Large Are Returns to Scale in the U.S.? 
 A View Across the Boundary   
Thomas Lubik (The Johns Hopkins University)
Sept. 07, 2005    Monetary Policy, Learning and the Speed of 
Convergence  
Guiseppe Ferrero (Bank of Italy)
Aug. 31, 2005    Macroeconomic Shocks and Foreign Bank 
Assets   
Claudia Buch (Tübingen University)
Aug. 24, 2005    Back to Square One: Identification Issues in 
DSGE Models  
Fabio Canova (IGIER, Bocconi University)
Aug. 10, 2005    The Private Benefits of Listing   
Jörg Rocholl (University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill)
Aug. 03, 2005    Exchange Rate Effects on Multinational 
Activity: Theory and Evidence   
Peter Egger (ifo, Institute for Economic Research)
July 27, 2005     Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic 
Persistence   
Fabio Milani (Princeton University) 
July 20, 2005    Money and the Great Disinflation  
Samuel Reynard (Swiss National Bank)
July 13, 2005    Consumption, Wealth, the Elasticity of Intertem-
poral Substitution and Long-Run Stock Market 
Returns. 
Carlo Favero (Bocconi University, Milan) 
July 06, 2005    How does Micro-Price Evidence help us un-
ravel the Aggregate Real Exchange Rate Puzzle? 
Mario J. Crucini (Vanderbilt University Nashville)
June 29, 2005    Inflation and the Price of Real Assets  
Martin Schneider (New York University) 
June 22, 2005    Health Insurance and Tax Policy  
Karsten Jeske (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) 
June 15, 2005    Non-Linearities and Unit Roots in G7 Macro-
economic Variables  
Yunus Aksoy (University of London) 
June 8, 2005    Household Expenditure and the Income Tax 
Rebates of 2001 
Nicholas S. Souleles (The University of 
Pennsylvania)
June 1, 2005    Epidemiological Expectations and Consump-
tion Dynamics  
Christopher Carroll (The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, Baltimore) 
May 25, 2005    Imperfect Information, Consumers‘ Expecta-
tions and Business Cycle 
Guido Lorenzoni (Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology)
May 18, 2005    What Makes Firms Voluntarily Fund Pension 
Liabilities? 
Joshua Rauh (University of Chicago) 
May 11, 2005    Incomplete Markets, Leverage and Crises  
Felix Kübler (University of Mannheim)
May 4, 2005    Job Displacement Risk and the Cost of 
Business Cycles  
Tom Krebs (Brown University, Providence) 
Joint Lunchtime Seminars18
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Fair Valuations: Modern Principles for Carrying out Valuations
On June 15, 2005 the German Shareholders‘Association in conjunction with the Center for Financial Studies and 
the magazine Die Aktiengesellschaft (The Stock Corporation) held a symposium in Frankfurt on the subject of 
“Modern Methods of Corporate Valuation”. Eric Nowak (University of Lugano and CFS Fellow) was responsible 
for structuring the content of the symposium.  
The Revised Version of the Idw-Standard
The reason for the event was the publication of the revised 
version of the Principles for Carrying Out Corporate Valua-
tions by the Institute of Auditors (IdW) by the IdW itself. The 
new regulations are intended to replace the previous standard 
(IdW S1). One central contentious issue, besides the derivati-
on of the basic rate of interest,  was the correct determination 
of a risk premium on top of the basic rate. The method favou-
red by the IdW produces risk premiums of between 5 and 6%. 
Accordingly investing in stocks provides, in the long term, a 
5-6% higher return than investing in long-term (secure) Ger-
man federal bonds.  However this assumption must be critically 
analyzed, because a study by the DAI in March 2004, for ex-
ample, showed the nominal performance of the German stock 
market for the period 1870 to 2004 to be 6.8%. If the long-
term average interest rate of 5.5% for secure bonds is deduc-
ted from this, however, the risk premium implied by the IdW 
cannot be upheld.
With regard to the valuation of corporations, particularly in the 
context of transfer of profit contracts and squeeze-out proce-
dures, the draft is quite explosive: The revision of the standard 
will lead to lower corporate values being determined. Sample 
calculations have shown reductions of up to 20%, which ulti-
mately represents a lot of money when calculating indemnity 
entitlements for minor shareholders in such situations.
In the face of an increasing number of such measures and po-
tential conflicts of interest between the bodies, major sharehol-
ders and their advisors on the one hand and minor shareholders 
on the other hand (e.g. T-Online, Celanese, Wella), the SdK be-
gan actively representing the interests of the minority sharehol-
ders and was able to gain CFS as a competent partner for the 
specialist symposium.
The goal of the event was to inform the participants of the 
most recent academic findings on corporate valuation and to 
discuss, objectively and critically, modern principles of cor-
porate valuation in general and the revised version of IdW S1 
in particular. Renowned experts, namely Ekkehard Wenger 
(University of Würzburg), Richard Stehle (Humboldt-Uni-
versity, Berlin), Olaf Ehrhardt (University of Witten/Her-
decke) and Claudio Loderer (University of Berne) made 
themselves available. 
Following on from the experts‘ informative speeches, a wi-
de-ranging and lively panel discussion took place. The panel 
received reinforcement from Günther Gebhardt from the 
University of Frankfurt. The panel discussion was particular-
ly characterized by the controversial, hard but fair and often 
amusing exchange of opinions between Wenger and Stehle. 
The latter was required to explain the reasons for his rethin-
king on the previously propagated risk premium of 2.6% to 
the current level of 5.5%. His most recent remarks on mar-
ket risk premium, which lead to lower corporate valuation, 
have ultimately been incorporated into the revised version of 
the IdW principles.
Naturally no agreement could be reached within the frame-
work of the symposium about the correct method of corporate 
valuation. However it was clear that the draft at issue is foun-
ded on many problematic assumptions and valuation premises, 
which will provide much potential for conflict in future, if they 
are put into practice in unaltered. The IdW would be well ad-
vised to thoroughly revise the draft at issue.
It may be hoped that the IdW puts into practice its suggestion, 
made at the end of the discussion, to hear out the SdK within in 
the framework of the final revision of the standard. The publi-
cation this year in a special pamphlet of the magazine The Stock 
Company of the results of the discussion and the speeches held 
should be helpful.  
Eric Nowak (Universität Lugano und CFS), 
Harald Rotter (SdK Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V.)19
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The  market  for  credit  risk  transfer 
is  estimated  by  Fitch  Ratings  to  have 
had  a  contractual  volume  of  $3  billi-
on at the end of 2003, and the British 
Bankers‘Association predicts an increa-
se to $8.2 billion in 2006. A large part 
of the transactions takes place between 
banks, but insurers and reinsurers are al-
so involved to a considerable degree.
By  means  of Alternative  Risk Transfer 
(ART) in the form of, for example, cat 
bonds or securitization of insurance con-
tracts, insurers and reinsurers can pass 
on  specific  risk  directly  to  the  capital 
market or other institutions. Due to re-
duced capacity on the insurance market, 
a sharp increase in transaction volume 
for these products was expected, which 
has, however, not materialized so far.
ART contracts for insurers and reinsu-
rers  and  credit  risk  transfer  contracts 
show  structural  similarities  with  insu-
rance contracts. Thus the new products 
are leading to an alignment of the in-
struments of risk transfer of the insuran-
ce and banking sectors. In principle the 
new  products  have  great  potential  for 
efficient risk allocation. However critics 
warn that many transaction partners do 
not  understand  the  basic  risk  structu-
re and that the transactions can have a 
negative influence on the ability of the 
banking system to function and raise sys-
temic risk.
The developments pose a number of im-
portant questions for the participants in 
the  capital  market. What  implications 
does the high volume of credit risk trans-
fer have for the ability of the banking sys-
tem to function: the allocation of loans, 
the banks‘ controlling function, the sta-
bility of the banking system? What do we 
know about the transfer of credit risk in 
the banking and insurance sectors - vo-
lume, motives, implications? Do parti-
cipants in the capital market understand 
the risk structure and is it included in ra-
tings? What challenges to regulatory and 
supervisory authorities will be presented 
by  the  developments? These  questions 
are of great practical relevance. 
Christian  Laux  from  the  Universi-
ty of Frankfurt and  Achim Wambach 
from  the  University  of  Erlangen-Nu-
remberg therefore organized the CFSre-
search conference “Risk Transfers Between 
(Re)Insurers,  Banks,  and  Markets”  in 
cooperation with the Stiftung Geld und 
Währung,  to  further  the  interchange 
between leading academics and practiti-
oners from the fields of banking and in-
surance.
Leading  international  academics  came 
together on the Campus Westend of the 
University  of  Frankfurt  to  discuss  re-
search projects with each other and with 
practitioners. The  topics  included  the 
effect of credit risk transfer on the be-
haviour of banks with regard to the allo-
cation of loans, implications for systemic 
risk  in  the  banking  sector  and  issues 
of regulation, problems of gauging and 
transferring operational risk, the work 
of reinsurers and brokers and risk trans-
fer contracts. 
Günter Franke (Universität Konstanz), 
Arno Gerken (McKinsey), Stuart Le-
wis (Deutsche Bank) und Paul Wollny 
(Ge  Insurance  Solutions)  discussed  va-
rious aspects of the topic as a panel.
Other  contributors  were  Franklin Al-
len (Wharton School), Ron Anderson 
(London  School  of  Economics),  Ste-
fan Arping (University of Amsterdam), 
Christina Bannier (University of Frank-
furt),  Silke  Brandts  (Bain  &  Compa-
ny),  Hans-Peter  Burghof  (University 
of  Hohenheim),  Elena  Carletti  (CFS), 
Fabio  Castiglionesi  (Universitat  Autó-
noma de Barcelona), Gabriella Chiesa 
(University  of  Bologna),  David  Cum-
mins  (Wharton  School),  Stephen  Di-
acon (University of Nottingham), Neil 
Doherty (Wharton School), Ralf Elsas 
(University  of  Frankfurt),  Falko  Fecht 
(Deutsche  Bundesbank),  Ingo  Fender 
(BIS),  Benedikt  Goderis  (University 
of  Cambridge),  Marcel  Grandi  (Mu-
nich Re), Denis Gromb (London Busi-
ness School), Hendrik Hakenes (Max 
Planck Institute, Bonn),  Frank Heine-
mann (University of Munich), Martin 
Hellwig  (Max-Planck-Institute,  Bonn), 
Thomas  Kaiser  (KPMG),  Gyöngyi 
Loranth (University of Cambridge), Ja-
net  Mitchell  (National  Bank  of  Belgi-
um), Alexander Mürmann (Wharton 
School), Georg Nöldeke (University of 
Bonn), Charlotte Ostergaard (Norwe-
gian  School  of  Management  und  Nor-
ges Bank), Christine Parlour (Carnegie 
Mellon), Rüdiger Reissaus (University 
of  Erlangen-Nuremberg),  Eva  Terber-
ger (University of Heidelberg) and Wolf 
Wagner (University of Cambridge und 
Tilburg).                      
Christian Laux 
(University of Frankfurt and CFS)
Risk Transfer Between  
(Re)Insurers, Banks, and Markets
Credit Risk Transfer, Collateralized Loan Obligations, Securitization, and Alternative Risk Transfer are forms of 
risk transfer that banks, insurers and reinsurers have developed in the last few years, to pass on risk to other in-
stitutions, e.g., other banks, other insurers or reinsurers, or to the market directly.  20
The event started with opening remarks by Jean-Claude Tri-
chet (ECB), and Donald Kohn (Federal Reserve Board) and 
Otmar Issing (ECB) delivered the luncheon and dinner spee-
ches. As in previous years, the audience consisted of resear-
chers  from  leading  universities,  international  organizations, 
and central banks, but also included financial market obser-
vers from private sector firms and representatives of the finan-
cial press.
In  the  first  research  contribution,  Klaus Adam  (ECB)  and 
Roberto Billi (CFS) analyzed monetary and fiscal policy in-
teractions in a dynamic general equilibrium model when po-
licy-makers lack the ability to credibly commit to policies ex 
ante. They identified the policy biases emerging from sequenti-
al and non-cooperative decision-making and assessed the desi-
rability of installing a central bank that is conservative in the 
sense of Rogoff (1985). The authors found that in the absence 
of monetary commitment, independently of whether fiscal po-
licy can commit, a conservative monetary policy completely 
eliminates the steady-state distortions generated by a lack of 
monetary commitment and may even eliminate the losses asso-
ciated with a lack of fiscal commitment. 
Willem Buiter (European Bank for Reconstruction and Deve-
lopment) employed a standard dynamic stochastic equilibrium 
model with price rigidities to study the inflation rate associa-
ted with optimal monetary and fiscal policy. His most impor-
tant result is that in the New Keynesian models considered by 
Woodford, there are no robust welfare-economic arguments 
for price stability as an objective of monetary policy. Instead, 
in these models, optimal inflation policy confirms the core in-
flation rate generated by the price-setter’s rule.
Next, Robert Tetlow and Brian Ironside (both Federal Re-
serve Board) presented their work on real-time model un-
certainty. They examined how the properties of the Federal 
Reserve Board model that is used to explain the US macro eco-
nomy have changed over time and how the optimal policies ha-
ve changed alongside. The authors found that time variation in 
the model’s properties was substantial and stress that policies 
should thus be designed to minimize the implications of model 
misspecification.
James Bullard (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) and Eric 
Schaling  (University  of  Johannesburg)  studied  determinacy 
and learnability of a rational-expectations equilibrium in a two-
country version of the New Keynesian model due to Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (2002). These countries might be viewed as 
the US and Europe, or as regions within the euro zone. Com-
paring their findings to known results for closed economies, th-
ey showed that open economy considerations in fact may play 
an important role for the degree of aggressiveness the policy-
maker should optimally adopt in his decisions. Their outcomes 
highlight that topics like exchange rate targeting or international 
monetary policy cooperation might have to be reconsidered.
Should the central bank raise or lower interest rates, and by 
how much, in response to a productivity shock? This was the 
question that Rochelle Edge (Federal Reserve Board), Tho-
mas Laubach (Federal Reserve Board and OECD) and John 
Williams (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco) analyzed. 
Employing a two-sector DGE model, they showed that shifts 
in long-run productivity growth have sizeable and highly per-
sistent effects on the real economy and on inflation which is 
consistent with the experience in the 1970s and 1990s. The op-
timal response of a central bank with respect to interest rates 
depends on whether a shock is perceived as temporary or per-
manent. In the former case, the optimal response is to lower 
interest rates, in the latter, to raise them.
Antonio Fatás,  Ilian Mihov (both INSEAD), and Andres 
Rose (University of California at Berkeley) investigated the 
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International Research Forum on Monetary Policy 
This year saw the third staging of the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy. The conference took 
place in Frankfurt on May 20-21, 2005, and was hosted by the European Central Bank (ECB). Since its creation in 
2002 by the ECB, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Center for German and Euro-
pean Studies at Georgetown University (CGES), and the Center for Financial Studies, the Research Forum’s goal 
has been to encourage research on monetary policy issues that are relevant from a global perspective. To this end 
the forum regularly organizes conferences held alternately in the euro area and the United States. This year’s con-
ference was organized by Ignazio Angeloni (ECB), Matthew Canzoneri (CGES), Dale Henderson (FRB) and Volker 
Wieland (University of Frankfurt and CFS).21
effect of quantitative targets for monetary policy on inflation 
and business cycle volatility. Using macroeconomic panel da-
ta they found that both employing and meeting quantitative 
targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly as-
sociated with lower inflation. Although the exact form of the 
monetary target also matters to some extent, it proves to be 
less important than having a quantitative target to start with. 
Thus, their research confirms the current consensus that cen-
tral banks should independently pursue well-defined goals in a 
transparent fashion.
Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher (both ECB) in-
stead took a closer look at the communication strategies of the 
Fed, the Bank of England, and the ECB, and evaluated their re-
lative effectiveness. As it turns out, each communication stra-
tegy has to be assessed in light of the respective committee’s 
decision-making process, and there is significant variation in 
these two aspects between the three institutions. Rather diplo-
matically, the authors found that in terms of policy predictabili-
ty and market responsiveness, the Fed and the ECB did equally 
well despite the difference in their strategies. The upshot is that 
for deciding on the most effective strategies for communicati-
on and for decision making, there may simply not be a unique 
optimal choice.
Nicoletta Batini, Alejandro Justiniano (both International 
Monetary Fund), Paul Levine (Surrey University), and Jo-
seph  Pearlman  (London  Metropolitan  University)  empiri-
cally examined model uncertainty in a two-bloc DSGE model 
with incomplete exchange-rate pass-through, and looked at the 
welfare implications of coordinating the two monetary rules. 
Based on their model estimates, the authors compared inflation 
forecast-based interest-rate rules by the Fed and the ECB, both 
under policy coordination and independence, respectively. The 
paper concluded that current inflation rules perform better 
than forward-looking rules, and that the gains from coordina-
tion are modest.
The lunch break was followed by an appraisal of the connec-
tion between exchange-rate policy and optimal nominal ex-
change-rate  volatility.  Michael  Devereux  (University  of 
British Columbia) and Charles Engel (University of Wiscon-
sin) interpreted exchange-rate policy as a trade-off between 
real exchange-rate smoothing to avoid distortions in consump-
tion allocations, and leaving sufficient room for terms-of-trade 
adjustments to facilitate expenditure switching. The optimal 
policy trade-off would then determine nominal exchange-ra-
te volatility, whose optimal level was found to be significantly 
lower than under a policy based on terms-of-trade considera-
tions only.
Ramsey-optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a medium-scale 
model of the U.S. business cycle was the subject of Stephanie 
Schmitt-Grohé and Martín Uribe (both Duke University). 
The authors incorporated a number of rigidities in their model 
and found that optimal monetary policy appears to pursue pri-
ce stability. A further result was that under an income tax re-
gime, they obtained an optimal inflation rate of half a per cent 
that is surprisingly stable despite the frictions present in the 
model. The competitive equilibrium implemented by simple 
monetary and fiscal rules resembles that attained by a Ramsey 
policy, with almost identical welfare levels. Allowing for diffe-
rential tax rates on capital and labor, the paper also found that 
optimal fiscal policy prescribes a large but highly volatile sub-
sidy for capital.
Michel  Juillard  (CEPREMAP),  Philippe  Karam,  Doug-
las Laxton (both International Monetary Fund), and Paolo 
Pesenti (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) concluded the 
conference by using a DSGE model of the U.S. economy to 
evaluate a welfare-based interest-rate rule. In maximizing the 
unconditional mean of utility, their rule was shown to be clo-
se to the Taylor efficiency frontier. Had this rule been used in 
practice for monetary policy guidance, it is claimed that the 
high inflation rates of the 1970s would have been avoided and 
the boom and bust cycles would have been less severe. The 
authors also evaluated the welfare consequences of excessive 
business-cycle variability for the U.S. and found them to be 
small, yet significant. 
The complete conference program including papers can 
be found at: www.ecb.int/events/conferences/html/int-
forum3.en.html
Julia Le Blanc/
Marcus Pramor (both CFS staff)
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The first day of the workshop, Thursday 
May 12th, was devoted to training lectu-
res for the young researchers of the AGE 
Network. The first lecture was given by 
Orazio  Attanasio  (University  Colle-
ge  London)  on  “Global  Demographic 
Trends and Social Security Reform” (co-
authored paper with S. Kitao and G. Vi-
olante). Their work focused on the issue 
of the sustainability of PAYG systems and 
the transition to a privatized pension sys-
tem. They explored the implications of 
different ways to pay for pensions and/or 
the transition for the welfare of different 
cohorts. Then, they presented how their 
results were affected by considering an 
open versus a closed economy. They sho-
wed that demographic trends make the 
current social security system unsustai-
nable, but different policy reforms have 
different  intragenerational  distribution 
consequences. Their main conclusion was 
that privatizing the social security system 
has large implications and might be very 
costly for some generations.
The  second  lecture  was  given  by  De-
borah Lucas (Northwestern Universi-
ty) on “Investing Public Pensions in the 
Stock Market: Implications for Risk Sha-
ring and Asset Prices” (joint work with J. 
Heaton). They used a computational ge-
neral equilibrium OLG model with ma-
ny  heterogeneous  agents,  calibrated  to 
examine the various implications of pen-
sion investment policy changes similar to 
those  currently  under  consideration  in 
the U.S. They showed that predicted as-
sets returns are fairly insensitive to whe-
ther stocks are held in the social security 
trust fund, independent of the details of 
policy  implementation.  However,  the 
implications for risk sharing and welfare 
are quite sensitive to the details, and so-
metimes counter-intuitive. According to 
their analysis the risk redistribution goals 
can be accomplished by program rules 
that mimic financial derivatives (as an al-
ternative to costly private accounts). 
“How  Do  Household  Portfolio  Shares 
Vary  with  Age”  was  the  third  invited 
lecture, given by Stephen Zeldes (Co-
lumbia University) (joint work with J. 
Ameriks).  They  examined  the  questi-
ons of how should portfolio allocations 
change with age and how do portfolio al-
locations change with age. In addressing 
the second issue, the authors explored 
the relative importance of age, time and 
cohort effects using US household level 
data. Their main finding was that there 
is no evidence supporting gradual dec-
line in equity shares with age. There was 
only limited indication of people shifting 
completely out of equity around retire-
ment as they begin to withdraw or annu-
itize their accumulation. 
The second and third days of the work-
shop  were  devoted  to  contributed 
papers. The first paper was on “Under-
standing  Saving  and  Portfolio  Choices 
with Predictable Changes in Asset Re-
turns”, and it was presented by Christi-
an Gollier (University of Toulouse). The 
author  described  how  existing  results 
on household portfolio literature can be 
generalized  to  non-CRRA  preferences. 
He also explored why unintuitive results 
hold when RRA is less than unity. He 
showed that both savings and portfolio 
choices are affected by the expectation 
of changes in the future opportunity set. 
The second presentation was on “Prefe-
rences and the Dynamic Representative 
Consumer”  by  Christos  Koulovatia-
nos (University of Vienna). He presen-
ted a model that leads to a representative 
consumer with a time-separable utility 
function,  in  a  single-commodity-type 
deterministic dynamic environment, in 
the  presence  of  consumer  wealth-,  la-
bor-productivity, and preference hetero-
geneity. He showed that when the rates 
The Sixth RTN Workshop on  
Economics of Aging in Europe (Age) 
The Sixth Workshop of the RTN on the Economics of Aging in Europe was 
held in Frankfurt on May 12-14 2005. It was hosted by the University of 
Frankfurt and sponsored by the European Union Marie Curie Research 
Training Networks and the Centre for Financial Studies, under its new 
program on Household Wealth Management. The conference organizer 
was Michael Haliassos of the University of Frankfurt and Program Direc-
tor at CFS.23
of  time  preference  are  heterogeneous 
across consumers, a representative con-
sumer exists if, and only if, the momen-
tary utility functions of all consumers are 
exponential. 
The  next  paper  was  on  “Risk-Return 
Preferences  in  the  Pension  Domain: 
Are People able to Choose?” and given 
by Maarten van Rooij (Central Bank 
of  the  Netherlands)  (joint  work  with 
C. Kool and G. Prast). They investiga-
ted  respondents’  attitudes  toward  DB 
and  DC  pension  schemes  using  data 
from Dutch households. In addition th-
ey explored whether respondents have 
consistent  preferences  with  respect  to 
portfolio choices for retirement saving. 
They found that the vast majority of hou-
seholds is in favor of compulsory saving 
for retirement and opts for a DB pensi-
on system. They also showed that given 
investor autonomy, agents face problems 
in bringing choices in line with their pre-
ferences. 
“How  Do  Risk Attitudes  Change  with 
Wealth? Nonparametric Evidence from 
a Hypothetical Gamble” was the fourth 
paper,  presented  by  Juergen  Maurer 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies). The main 
aim of his study was to illuminate the 
relationship  between  risk  aversion  and 
wealth, using households’ response to a 
hypothetical gamble and nonparametric 
estimation techniques. He found that ab-
solute risk aversion declines slowly with 
wealth. 
The  next  presentation  was  on  “Using 
Stated Preferences Data to Analyze Pre-
ferences for Full and Partial Retirement” 
given by Arthur van Soest (RAND and 
Tilburg  University)  (co-authored  with 
A. Kapteyn and J. Zissimopoulos). They 
described an experiment with measuring 
retirement  opportunities  as  perceived 
by  the  respondents,  as  well  as  prefe-
rences for retirement. For the latter, re-
spondents evaluated how attractive they 
found  a  number  of  virtual,  simplified, 
retirement  trajectories  involving  early 
retirement, late retirement, and gradual 
retirement with different corresponding 
income paths. The data on preferences 
were used to estimate a stylized structu-
ral model of retirement decisions. They 
found that people are reasonably satis-
fied with retiring at the benchmark age 
and that there is no strong preference 
for phased retirement. In addition if la-
te retirement were to be made more at-
tractive by providing financial incentives, 
these incentives should be quite strong 
and should exceed by far the actuarially 
fair adjustments. 
Rob Euwals (CPB and IZA) presented 
the  next  paper  on  “Early  Retirement 
Behavior in the Netherlands: Evidence 
from  a  Policy  Reform”  (co-authored 
with D. van Vuuren and R. Wolthoff). 
Using  Dutch  panel  data,  the  authors 
estimated hazard rate models for early 
retirement. They  found  evidence  that 
the policy reform induces workers to 
postpone  early  retirement. They  sho-
wed  that  the  transitional  scheme  has 
already led to average retirement post-
ponement by 8 months, which will be-
come almost a year once the transition 
is completed. 
Carolina Fugazza (Center for Research 
on Pensions and Welfare Policies) pre-
sented  a  paper  on  “Investing  for  the 
Long-run in European Real Estate: Does 
Predictability matter?” (joint work with 
M. Guidolin and G. Nicodano). The au-
thors  derived  optimal  portfolio  shares 
under  excess  return  predictability  and 
parameter uncertainty, including real es-
tate in the menu of assets. They found 
that the weight for real estate is between 
10% and 30% for intermediate values of 
RRA and that the welfare costs of igno-
ring real estate are increasing with RRA 
and planning horizon. 
The last paper was on “Temperant Port-
folio  Choice  with  a  Correlated  Back-
ground  Risk”  given  by  Hector  Calvo 
(DELTA) (joint work with L. Arrondel). 
They investigated the impact of income 
risk on the demand for risky assets using 
data on French households. They showed 
that the probability of stock market par-
ticipation increases for those with nega-
tively correlated incomes while they did 
not  identify  any  effect  with  regard  to 
those with positively correlated or un-
correlated incomes. 
On the 3rd day of the workshop, May 
14th, the first paper was on “The Forgo-
ne Gains of Incomplete Portfolios” pre-
sented by Monica Paiella (Ente Luigi 
Einaudi). She estimated a lower bound 
to the forgone gains of incomplete port-
folios, which are in turn a lower bound 
to the entry costs that could rationalize 
non-participation  to  financial  markets. 
She showed that such estimated bound 
can provide a heuristic test for the cost-
based  explanation  of  limited  financial 
market participation, since high estima-
tes would imply unrealistically high par-
ticipation  costs. The  main  finding  was 
that the participation cost explanation of 
limited  stock  market  participation  can 
not be rejected. 
“The Impact of Interest Rate Subsidies 
on  Long-Term  Household  Debt:  Evi-
dence from a Large Program” was the 
second  paper,  presented  by  Ernesto 
Villanueva  (Universitat  Pompeu  Fa-
bra)  (co-authored  with  N.  Martins). 
They  explored  whether  mortgage  in-
terest rate subsidies affect the demand 
of  long-term  household  debt,  utili-
zing Portuguese micro data. They con-
cluded  that  borrowing  among  groups 
on the margin of home-ownership re-
sponds to interest rates incentives. The 
next  paper  was  on  “Varying  Life  Ex-
pectancy and Social Security” given by   
Antoine  Bommier  (University  of 
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CFS Summer School on “Empirical Research 
in Banking and Corporate Finance”
Jan Pieter Krahnen (University of Frankfurt and CFS) and 
Ralf Elsas (University of Frankfurt) organized this years‘ Cor-
porate Finance Summer School at the Training Center of the 
Deutsche  Bundesbank  in  Eltville/Rheingau,  featuring  Jay 
Ritter (University of Florida) and Philip E. Strahan (Car-
roll School of Management, Boston College), two renowned 
scholars in corporate finance, as lecturers. The summer school 
focused on key aspects of empirical research, with special em-
phasis on empirical research in banking and financial markets.
Philip E. Strahan covered the first half of the summer school 
with his lectures on the ban-
king aspect, starting with the 
basic question “What is special 
about banks?” and the seminal 
articles by Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983) and Fama (1985). 
He  stressed  that  the  original 
role of banks - to provide cre-
dit  financing  -  had  declined 
over time while the provision of liquidity to clients and security 
issuance had gained importance. In his lectures, he also follo-
wed this time trend, starting with banks as information provi-
ders and its support in empirical studies, then moving on to 
 Toulouse) (joint work with M. Leroux 
and J. Lozachmeur). They showed that 
heterogeneity of life expectancy plays a 
key role in the design of social security. 
In their framework the social optimum 
is obtained when individuals living lon-
ger retire later and consume less than 
short lived individuals. 
The  fourth  paper  was  on  “Obesity, 
Health  and  Socio-economic  Status:  an 
International Comparison” presented by 
Pierre-Carl  Michaud  (CentER,  Til-
burg University) (joint work with A. van 
Soest). They studied the association bet-
ween obesity, health, use of health care, 
and socio-economic status and explored 
some explanations for the cross coun-
try differences. Their empirical findings 
based  on  SHARE  data  from  10  Euro-
pean countries and HRS from the US. 
Their main conclusion was that only a 
small share of the difference in average 
body mass index between the U.S. and 
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Europe can be explained by differences 
in health behaviors and food consump-
tion. 
The last presentation was on “Demand 
Patterns  around  Retirement:  Evidence 
from Spanish Panel Data” by Mette Lun-
de  Christensen  (CAM  and  IFS).  She 
examined  demand  patterns  before  and 
after retirement, using a Spanish panel 
data set on household expenditures, in 
which  households  are  followed  across 
the retirement threshold. She found no 
evidence for an income fall for the reti-
ring households. She also examined the 
effect  of  retirement  on  budget  shares. 
She  found  no  significant  effect  on  any 
commodity groups, with only excepti-
on being the fall in share of medicine ex-
penditures. 
The  following  academics  contributed 
to the conference as discussants of pre-
sented  papers:  Bernd  Fitzenberger 
(University of Frankfurt), Dimitris Ge-
orgarakos  (University  of  Frankfurt), 
Christian  Gollier  (University  of  To-
louse),  Tullio  Jappelli  (University  of 
Salerno), Arie Kapteyn (RAND), Dirk 
Krüger (University of Frankfurt), And-
re  Massson  (DELTA),  Jan  van  Ours 
(Tilburg  University),  Mario  Padula 
(University of Salerno), Arthur van So-
est (RAND and Tilburg University), Di-
mitrios Tsomocos (Oxford University) 
and Ralf  Wilke (ZEW). 
Michael Haliassos 
(University of Frankfurt and CFS)
CFS Summer Schools “Empirical Research in Banking and  
Corporate Finance” and “Learning in Macroeconomic Models:  
Recent Advances and Policy Applications”
The CFS Summer Schools took place on 15-22 August, 2005 at the Training Center of the Deutsche Bundesbank in 
Eltville/Rheingau, and included classes on both finance and macroeconomics.
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liquidity provision, security underwriting and interaction bet-
ween banking, law and economic performance.
In his paper-based lectures, Strahan strongly focused on the em-
pirical issues in the various articles and highlighted strengths 
and weaknesses of the analyses. The underlying data sample, 
endogeneity problems and omitted variables were crucial and 
recurring aspects. Using existing research, he taught the parti-
cipants how to critically evaluate empirical studies and how to 
spot issues which offer promising avenues for paper improve-
ments or new research.
In various special sessions, Strahan also addressed more fun-
damental issues of academic research. Together with the stu-
dents, he discussed questions like “What is good (empirical) 
research?“, “How do you develop ideas?” and (most critically 
for any academic career) “How do you get papers published?”. 
Using both anecdotal evidence and personal experience, Stra-
han provided a service to the participants of considerable value 
to them, as these issues are rarely taught in standard courses.
The second half (and corporate 
finance part) of the course was 
taught by Jay Ritter who focus-
ed  on  detailed  discussions  of 
endogeneity  problems  in  em-
pirical studies, the potential is-
sues  arising  when  measuring 
long-term abnormal returns in 
financial markets and the more 
recent issues arising from behavioral finance and capital structu-
re literature. By redoing existing empirical studies, he illustra-
ted how the use of alternative techniques and/or specifications 
greatly influences the robustness of results.
Ritter subsequently illustrated the implicit rebalancing assump-
tion behind the use of CAARs (cumulative average abnormal 
returns) and urged the students to think about frequency is-
sues, benchmark choices and alternative methods (such as the 
regression approach of Fama and French 1993) when using ab-
normal returns in their own studies. In the final part of his lec-
ture, Ritter then looked at behavioral finance literature with 
special emphasis on firms‘ capital structure and the influential 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) paper on the market timing of firms 
issuing debt or equity.
Due to the outstanding caliber of the scholars and their lec-
tures, the summer school was considered a great event by the 
42  international  students  attending.  In  addition,  many  used 
the opportunity of having a high-caliber, interested audience 
to present and discuss their own work, both in organized and 
spontaneous sessions. Last but not least, the beautiful surroun-
dings of the Eltville region provided a superb backdrop for an 
enjoyable week of socializing and the exchange of ideas.
Patrick Herbst (University of Frankfurt)
CFS Summer School on “Learning in 
Macroeconomic Models: Recent Advances 
and Policy Applications”
This year’s macroeconomic summer school featured a most 
distinguished faculty comprising Seppo Honkapohja (Uni-
versity of Cambridge), Ramon Marimon (Universitat Pom-
peu Fabra), Timothy Cogley (University of California, Davis), 
and Volker Wieland (University of Frankfurt and CFS). The 
lectures covered both the theoretical and the empirical aspects 
of the role of learning and expectations formation in under-
standing macroeconomic and financial phenomena. A further 
aspect was the application of learning concepts to policy de-
sign. The participants consisted of 30 international students co-
ming mostly from universities and central banks.
The first lecturer, Seppo Honkapohja, treated monetary policy 
from the viewpoint of bounded rationality and adaptive lear-
ning. He discussed how learning was used to assess the plausi-
bility of rational expectations equilibria (REE), to select among 
the equilibrium when there are multiple REE and to model dy-
namic paths outside an equilibrium. Honkapohja also showed 
how this approach has recently been used to yield new and im-
portant implications for theoretical and empirical research in 
monetary policy.
Ramon Marimon provided a broad survey of current develop-
ments  in  the  learning  theory 
in  macroeconomics.  First  re-
vising some of the basic ele-
ments that led to the “rational 
expectations revolutions”, Ma-
rimon continued his lecture by 
exploring  the  links  between 
learning  and  credibility.  His 
particular emphasis was on the 
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presentation of the empirical evidence, both experimental and 
historical, that is consistent with non-ad-hoc learning models 
but can hardly be explained with traditional rational expecta-
tions equilibrium models. In the last part of his lecture, Mari-
mon outlined how learning can help policy design and, in turn, 
help to explain observed outcomes and practices, often at odds 
with existing classical, or new-Keynesian, theories. 
Presenting his own work on learning of policymakers, Timothy 
Cogley argued that central bank learning can explain the dyna-
mics of the US postwar inflation rate. He also touched the questi-
on if and to which degree experimentation characterizes optimal 
monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty. In addition, Cog-
ley discussed the role that learning can play to explain the behavi-
or of asset prices. Finally, a practical session in the computer lab 
allowed students to get some hands-on experience in Bayesian 
learning by replicating some of Cogley’s results.
Volker Wieland introduced participants to a theoretical frame-
work that can be used to analyze the joint learning and decisi-
on-making of macroeconomic policymakers under imperfect 
knowledge about the economy. As applications of this frame-
work Wieland presented his work on monetary policy after the 
German unification. Further topics of his course included mo-
netary policy under uncertainty about the natural unemploy-
ment rate as well as monetary policy under uncertainty about 
inflation-output tradeoffs and the possibility of discretionary 
inflation bias. Finally, he provided valuable insight into numeri-
cal methods for solving the joint learning and decision problem 
of the central bank and gave the participants the opportunity 
to work with and extend a numerical algorithm for a baseline 
learning and control problem.
Another important element of the Summer School were six 
paper presentations by participating students, all addressing to-
pics dealing with learning in macroeconomic models and ran-
ging from monetary policy to asset pricing. These presentations 
contributed to a lively and research-oriented atmosphere at the 
Summer School that is likely to shape the future work of many 
of the participants. 
Julia Le Blanc (CFS staff), Günter Beck 
(University of Frankfurt and CFS)
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The ECB and its Watchers VII 
On Friday, June 3, 2005 the 7th installment of the CFS trademark conference series “The ECB and its Watchers” 
took place in Frankfurt. The conference was organized by Volker Wieland (Center for Financial Studies) and 
brought together 20 distinguished speakers from banks, think tanks, central banks and academia for an open dis-
cussion with ECB officials regarding current challenges faced by European policymakers. Registered conference 
participants comprised 170 professionals from the financial community, central banks and academia and about 
60 media representatives. 27
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As  in  previous  years,  the  conference 
featured  presentations  by  various  ECB 
wachters  with  a  direct  response  from 
Otmar Issing (European Member of the 
Executive Board of the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB)). In the afternoon, an 
additional panel on Monetary and Fis-
cal Policy debated the political econo-
my of the Stability and Growth Pact. A 
third panel was dedicated to a debate on 
monetary policy and central bank com-
munication. 
In his welcome address Volker Wieland 
emphasized the uniqueness of this event 
in  terms  of  bringing  together  central 
bank  critics  and  central  bank  decision 
makers for a public exchange of opinion. 
He  explicitly  thanked  both  Otmar Is-
sing and Lucas Papademos (Vice-Presi-
dent of the ECB) for their willingness to 
participate in the conference and there-
by making this exemplary case of central 
bank communication possible. 
ECB Monitoring
 
The first panel, chaired by Volker Wie-
land, gave various ECB watchers the op-
portunity to express their views about 
the  current  stance  of  monetary  poli-
cy in the Eurozone. Jordi Gali (CREI, 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and CEPR) 
rejected  recent  public  criticism  of  the 
ECB that it had not placed enough im-
portance  on  economic  growth. To  un-
derpin his opinion he pointed out that 
the expected real interest rate in the Eu-
rozone had been below its “natural” le-
vel of 2% for most of the time since the 
introduction of the euro. Likewise, ac-
tual interest rates in the Eurozone had 
been almost always below the level that 
was implied by a Taylor rule. He provi-
ded evidence that longer-term expected 
inflation rates had remained below 2% 
throughout the last 6 years and argued 
that this could be considered the result 
of a successful monetary policy by the 
ECB. However, it could also be the ca-
se that a structural change had occurred 
that had lowered the natural rate. This 
could lead to problems if market partici-
pants did not recognize the shift and re-
quired an expansionary monetary policy 
that would not be appropriate for the 
new situation. 
Giancarlo Corsetti (European Univer-
sity Institute, and CEPR) stressed that 
an important lesson from the European 
currency turbulence in the early 1990s 
was that credibility and good policy ma-
king cannot be imported, but must start 
“at home”. He pointed out that the in-
troduction of the euro had occurred in 
a  favorable  international  environment 
characterized by sustained high growth 
in the U.S. and a strong dollar. However, 
the scenario has changed in the meanti-
me. In particular, he argued that persis-
tent high U.S. current account deficits 
could be a threat to international growth 
and  stability  prospects.  Amongst  the 
questions  that  European  policymakers 
face in this situation are whether Europe 
is ready to fend off important threats to 
European prosperity from an unbalanced 
world economy, and whether there is a 
need for the ECB to change the conduct 
of its monetary policy in the face of the 
risk of global instability. 
Daniel Gros (Centre for European Po-
licy Studies) focused on long- to medi-
um-term trends in his presentation. He 
showed  that  stabilization  policy  in  the 
U.S. had been much more active than in 
the Eurozone in recent years. As major 
reasons  for  the  relative  output  growth 
decline  in  Europe  Daniel  Gros  identi-
fied insufficient investment growth and 
a relative total factor productivity dec-
line. However, he also emphasized that 
not all EMU member countries had ex-
hibited a weak economic performance. 
In particular, smaller countries have had 
GDP  growth  rates  comparable  to  that 
of the U.S. He expressed concerns that 
the concentration of policy on short-run 
developments in Europe had led to the 
build-up of problems such as rising debt 
ratios or a monetary overhang. These pro-
blems were aggravated by emerging int-
ra-area differences that might eventually 
lead to political pressure on the ECB.
Similarly  to  Jordi  Gali,  Joachim  Fels 
(Morgan  Stanley)  stated  that  financial 
market participants who had criticized 
the ECB for reacting too sluggishly to 
changes  in  the  economic  environment 
had been wrong. He suggested that the 
major  reason  for  the  market  partici-
pants’ misperception was that the ECB’s 28
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words and actions had not been aligned 
and that markets were often more in-
fluenced by words than by actions. He 
praised the ECB for being predictive and 
suggested that the ECB’s monetary stra-
tegy was considerably better than that of 
many other central banks. 
William Dickens (Brookings Instituti-
on) presented evidence from the Inter-
national Wage  Flexibility  Project. The 
results show that in the U.S. and Canada 
large downward nominal rigidities exist, 
whereas in Europe there are both coun-
tries with large and small downward no-
minal rigidities. Moreover, the findings 
suggest that countries with considerable 
downward nominal wage rigidities exhi-
bit less downward real wage rigidities. 
William Dickens argued that while U.S. 
and Canadian central banks can reduce 
equilibrium unemployment by maintai-
ning  moderate  rates  of  inflation,  the 
ECB may not be able to yield such an ef-
fect as the EMU includes countries wi-
thout substantial nominal rigidity such 
as France, Belgium and Germany. Mo-
reover, should the ECB allow inflation 
rates to fall much lower, countries with 
substantial nominal rigidity could begin 
to experience significant increases in the 
equilibrium unemployment rate.
Laurence  Meyer  (Meyer’s  Monetary 
Policy Insights) discussed the question of 
what responsibility a central bank should 
take for the emergence of an unsustai-
nable  current  account  imbalance  and 
what role a central bank has in facilita-
ting the adjustment of such an imbalan-
ce. He expressed the view that a central 
bank should take an “indirect” approach 
to  monetary  policy. According  to  this 
approach a central bank should respond 
only to deviations from its mandated ob-
jectives and respond to all other shocks 
and developments only in so far as they 
affect the path and/or forecasts for its 
objective variables. Laurence Meyer also 
provided an analysis of potential causes 
for differences in the conduct of moneta-
ry policy between the Fed and the ECB. 
He argued that they might be the result 
of differences in the structure of the eco-
nomies in which they operate, and/or 
differences in strategy. Laurence Meyer 
pointed out that differences in the eco-
nomic structure between the U.S. and 
the Eurozone such as lower confidence 
in  the  relationship  between  aggregate 
demand and the policy rate in the Euro-
zone relative to the U.S. can cause stabi-
lization policy to be more effective in the 
U.S. than in the Eurozone. He stressed 
that these differences could provide an 
explanation for the differences in mone-
tary strategies between the Fed, which 
has a mandate to focus both on inflation 
and output gaps, and the ECB, which has 
a mandate to primarily focus on inflati-
on only. In this context Laurence Meyer 
called the FED’s mandate a “dual” man-
date and the ECB’s mandate a “hierarchi-
cal” one. Laurence Meyer also discussed 
the question of how the price stability 
objective should be defined, how expli-
cit it should be, and how success should 
be monitored. He expressed the opini-
on that the Fed should adopt an explicit 
numerical objective for inflation. Howe-
ver, he made it clear that his preferred 
approach is different from an inflation 
targeting approach. He argued that he 
associated the latter approach with the 
combination of a hierarchical objective 
as well as an explicit numerical objecti-
ve. On the contrary, the Fed would very 
likely adopt the numerical objective in 
the context of its prevailing dual man-
date,  should  it  move  in  this  direction. 
He argued that the ECB’s initial defini-
tion  of  price  stability  was  problematic 
for two reasons. Defining price stability 
as given when the overall inflation rate 
is below 2% can cause monetary policy 
to react asymmetrically to positive and 
negative demand shocks. Moreover, the 
experience of the 1990s has shown that 
policymakers  should  be  at  least  as  fo-
cused on returning inflation to its target 
Laurence Meyer, Thomas Mayer29
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from below as from above. Referring to 
the recent refinement of the ECB’s infla-
tion target, Laurence Meyer argued that 
it represented a clear improvement over 
the earlier practice, but that he still pre-
ferred a narrow range like 1% – 2%, or, 
as a second choice, a simple point objec-
tive. Laurence Meyer also discussed the 
question of how the central bank should 
monitor its success relative to the ob-
jective. He argued that if one is setting 
current policy in terms of recent inflati-
on performance relative to the inflation 
objective, it would be advantageous to 
focus on core rather than overall inflati-
on. The reason is that core inflation may 
provide a more reliable reading of over-
all inflation over the policy horizon than 
overall inflation which may be domina-
ted by spikes in inflation associated with 
price level shocks. He suggested that an 
approach that focused more on overall 
inflation might respond more aggressi-
vely to supply shocks, unless the focus of 
the policy was on an intermediate term 
inflation rate that would not necessarily 
have been affected by the supply shock.
Thomas  Mayer  (Deutsche  Bank)  sta-
ted that the ECB was caught between a 
rock, i.e. economic weakness, and a hard 
place, i.e. strong liquidity growth. In his 
opinion the ECB had paid more attenti-
on to short-term economic weakness so 
far. However, to keep the euro “hard”, 
long-term threats from strong liquidity 
growth ought to be given more weight. 
As inflation was mainly a monetary phe-
nomenon the recent liquidity develop-
ment  represented  a  major  danger  to 
price stability in the Eurozone. 
Ulrich Kater (Deka Bank) noted that, 
from a market perspective, neither the 
heavily  discussed  inflation  differentials 
nor the development of monetary ag-
gregates were a major concern. He said 
that  the  recent  claims  of  the  German 
government,  which  make  the  mone-
tary policy of the ECB responsible for 
the  dismal  economic  performance  in 
Germany, represented a new dimensi-
on in criticism of the ECB. As the euro 
was first and foremost a political pro-
ject, certain negative economic conse-
quences should be borne by the member 
states  without  immediately  giving  ri-
se to potentially dangerous political la-
mentations.
In his reply Otmar Issing said that the 
conduct of monetary policy in a hete-
rogeneous  economic  environment  was 
nothing unusual. Like in the Eurozone 
large differences in inflation and econo-
mic growth rates exist across U.S. states. 
However,  he  admitted  that  the  persis-
tence of inflation rates in the Eurozone 
was larger. Nevertheless, he expressed 
the view that the U.S. experience sho-
wed that monetary policy can work well 
for heterogeneous geographical units. Is-
sing rejected the notion that the ECB’s 
monetary  policy  had  been  too  expan-
sionary or too restrictive. Contrary to 
Thomas Mayer, he expressed the view 
that the ECB had fully met market ex-
pectations. 
Concerning the issue of credibility Ot-
mar  Issing  admitted  that  the  ECB  had 
had difficulties  convincing market parti-
cipants that it was able to fight inflation 
when the euro was introduced. To build 
up credibility the ECB had announced a 
strategy  that  everyone  understood  and 
it had committed to the announced tar-30
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get. He expressed the view that 6 years 
of successful monetary policy should be 
enough to convince critics of the ECB’s 
ability  to  fight  inflation. An  important 
ingredient  for  the  successful  conduct 
of  monetary  policy  was  the  successful 
extraction  of  real-time  signals.  It  was 
particularly  important  to  successfully 
disentangle real from monetary shocks. 
Looking back at the past 6 years Otmar 
Issing argued that the ECB had been suc-
cessful in achieving this task. 
Referring to the most recent rejections 
of the draft for the European constituti-
on in France and the Netherlands Issing 
expressed the opinion that it was very 
important to win the vote of  EU citi-
zens. He said that this task was an impor-
tant communication challenge.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy - 
The Political Economy of the 
Stability and Growth Pact
The second panel, chaired by Manfred 
J. M. Neumann (University of Bonn), 
focused on the interaction between mo-
netary and fiscal policy. A special empha-
sis was given to the design and potential 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Klaus Regling (European Commission) 
started his presentation by giving a short 
summary  of  major  changes  that  were 
implemented in the 2005 reform of the 
Stability  and  Growth  Pact.  He  argued 
that the reform achieved a proper balan-
ce between more room for judgement, 
increased flexibility and preserving the 
rules-based character of the system. Mo-
reover, it provided a good basis for in-
creased national ownership. He summed 
up his presentation by claiming that the 
existing fiscal rules were good, but what 
ultimately mattered was their effective 
implementation. 
Caio Koch-Weser (German Federal Mi-
nistry of Finance) called the 2005 reform 
of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  a  big 
step forward towards more strategic fis-
cal coordination in the Euro- zone and in 
the European Union. He stressed that it 
struck a good balance between stability 
and economic growth and that the refor-
med Pact was more intelligent in terms 
of economic rationale. The key test, ho-
wever, would be its implementation. Ca-
io Koch-Weser claimed that the new Pact 
made it possible to better assess fiscal po-
licy in member states and to address pro-
blems early on. Moreover, it allowed the 
full economic picture to be taken into ac-
count and would not, unlike its predeces-
sor, focus on only a few figures such as the 
deficit rate. Referring to cases in the re-
cent past Caio Koch-Weser also pointed 
out that work on timely and higher-quali-
ty statistics was needed and that therefore 
the role of Eurostat as an independent sta-
tistical office had to be improved. 
Lucas  Papademos  (Vice-President  of 
the European Central Bank) argued that   
rigorous  and  consistent  implementati-
on of the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact  was  crucial  for  sound  public  fi-
nances in the Eurozone. He noted that 
the  credibility  of  the  reformed  Pact 
would be tested in the coming months 
as the budgetary provisions of countries 
with excessive deficits were assessed by 
the European Commission and the Eu-
ropean Council. He expressed his hope 
that this test would be passed successful-
ly because it was of decisive importance 
for  the  credibility  of  the  fiscal  frame-
work of the EMU countries. Moreover, 
only a sound fiscal policy would ensure 
the compatibility of fiscal policies with 
the stability-oriented monetary policy of 
the ECB, the anchoring of expectations 
of fiscal discipline and the establishment 
of macroeconomic conditions conducive 
to sustainable growth.
Michael Deppler  (IMF)  shared  Klaus 
Regling’s view that the success of the re-
formed Stability and Growth Pact mostly 
depended on its proper and consequent 
implementation. He pointed out that in-31
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creased flexibility certainly could be ad-
vantageous but also bore the risk that the 
rules-based framework would be washed 
out. He emphasized that ultimately in-
dividual  governments  could  not  blame 
Brussels for bad economic outcomes in 
their respective countries but that they 
were the ones who were responsible for 
good or bad policy. 
Monetary Policy and Central 
Bank Communication
The third panel was chaired by Lucre-
zia  Reichlin  (ECB)  and  focused  on 
the  interaction  between  central  bank 
communication  and  monetary  policy. 
Marcel Fratzscher (ECB) pointed out 
that there were stark differences in the 
communication  strategies  of  the  Fed, 
the ECB and the BoE. Whereas the ap-
proach of the Fed could be described as 
an individualistic one, the ECB and the 
BoE followed a collegiate approach. Ho-
wever, the results of an empirical stu-
dy that he had conducted together with 
Michael  Ehrmann  (ECB)  showed  that 
transparent  and  effective  policy  could 
be  achieved  with  very  different  com-
munication strategies and therefore the-
re  was  no  single  best  communication 
strategy. 
In  his  presentation  Richard  Clarida 
(Clinton Group and Columbia Universi-
ty) discussed several dimensions of cen-
tral bank communication. First, a central 
bank could simply report decisions that 
had already been made. By referring to 
the FED’s communication policy in the 
70s Richard Clarida made clear that this 
had not always been the case. Secondly, 
it could communicate decisions that had 
not been made. In this context Richard 
Clarida  pointed  out  that  a  decision  to 
leave policy unchanged was a policy de-
cision. Thirdly, a central bank could exp-
lain why a certain decision was made by, 
e.g., providing its information about the 
current state of the economy and ma-
king its own forecasts public. Fourthly, 
it could communicate the expected path 
of policy. This, however, could be redun-
dant if forecasts were published. Finally, 
a central bank could communicate infor-
mation on relative prices versus price le-
vels versus inflation. Referring to Lucas’ 
famous paper on this topic Richard Cla-
rida pointed out that regular systematic 
communication of a central bank on the 
contribution of each to a rise in observed 
prices would have potential value over 
and above the forecast. 
Vincent  Reinhart  (Federal  Reserve 
Board) expressed the view that central 
banks  had  a  tendency  to  overestima-
te their ability to influence macro out-
comes.  He  argued  that  central  banks 
certainly  were  influential  but  that  the 
resilience of a market economy in ab-
sorbing shocks was more important. He 
stated that the ECB might have missed 
some  opportunities  to  influence  eco-
nomic activity, in part by not having a 32
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broad enough array of communications 
devices.  However,  he  also  made  clear 
that  structural  economic  reforms  that 
were  outside  the  pursuits  of  a  central 
bank probably had the greatest chance of 
generating longer-term benefits in ma-
cro stabilization.
Lars  Svensson  (Princeton  University) 
stated that not only the level of interest 
rates was important but also its historical 
path. He argued that long-term interest 
rates were the ones that economists we-
re interested in and that these rates were 
influenced by expectations about future 
economic developments. In this context, 
the task of monetary policy was to mana-
ge expectations. The most effective way 
of doing this was to publish and discuss 
the  central  bank’s  forecasts  about  key 
macro variables such as the inflation rate 
and the output gap. As a benchmark mo-
del Lars Svensson referred to the Bank 
of Norway. 
David Walton (Goldman Sachs) argued 
that  there  was  a  number  of  areas  in 
which the ECB could consider refining 
its communication. However, these refi-
nements should be seen in the context of 
the ECB’s success in meeting its inflation 
objective, stabilizing inflation expectati-
ons and reducing variability of output. 
In his opinion, the disappointing perfor-
mance of Euroland’s economy owed mo-
re to demographic and structural factors 
than the ECB’s conduct and communica-
tion of monetary policy.
In his concluding remarks, Otmar Issing 
noted that the ECB was early on confron-
ted with substantial criticism. A major re-
ason for this criticism was the role of the 
monetary pillar that had been seen as su-
perfluous and even confusing by critics. 
Contrary to this view Otmar Issing sta-
ted that the ECB’s successful policy over 
the last 7 years had been founded on the 
two-pillar strategy in which a thorough 
analysis of monetary developments had 
played a key role. As a major challenge 
for monetary analysis Otmar Issing iden-
tified the real-time extraction of signals 
of  medium-term  inflationary  or  defla-
tionary pressures from monetary deve-
lopments. In his opinion, the ECB had 
been successful in disentangling, in real 
time, money demand shocks and noise 
in monetary developments from the un-
derlying trends. He pointed out that the 
ECB had consistently communicated the 
role of the monetary pillar and any un-
certainty  related  to  monetary  develop-
ments  to  market  participants.  Otmar 
Issing interpreted the high predictablity 
of its decisions as an indicator of the lar-
ge degree of transparency that the ECB 
has achieved. He also made clear that the 
Governing Council of the ECB had not 
disregarded the ample liquidity situation. 
He pointed out that the Council had been 
constantly aware of the risks of monetary 
developments to price stability. However, 
as economic indicators had increasingly 
pointed to a deteriorating economic situ-
ation in the Eurozone towards the end of 
2004, the Council came to the conclusi-
on that the risks to price stability might 
not materialize, but continued to warrant 
vigilance. 
Günter Beck 
(University of Frankfurt and CFS)33
Value based management implies the gearing of all management 
measures towards increasing a firm‘s shareholder value. Its main 
areas of application are valuating, management pay and measur-
ing performance. Ideally a manager is paid in accordance with the 
increase in value he has generated, in order to act in accordance 
with the shareholders‘ interests. Traditional profitability ratios, 
e.g. RoI (Return on Investment) and RoE (Return on Equity), 
and value based ratios, e.g. RoIC (Return on Invested Capital) or 
CFRoI (Cash Flow Return on Investment) have one main disad-
vantage, namely that the attainment of value is only measured as 
a (relative) return (success period/capital invested). Absolute ra-
tios are essential for adequate value based management. Not only 
for this reason were value contribution ratios increasingly able to 
push out profitability ratios from their top spot as shareholder 
value ratios for DAX 100 firms between 2000 and 2003.  Exam-
ples of conventional value contribution ratios are, amongst oth-
ers, Economic Value Added (EVA), Cash Value Added (CVA) and 
the new ratio ERIC. They are calculated on the basis of residual 
profit, i.e. interest on all the initial capital invested is subtracted 
from the amount of profit. ERIC‘s main distinguishing charac-
teristic in comparison with other value contribution ratios is the 
way in which capital costs are calculated on the basis of risk-free 
instead of risk-adjusted interest. In this way erroneous assess-
ments in the ex post measuring of performance and erroneous 
incentives in management pay should be avoided. 
ERIC does not mix risk and temporal structure in one rate of in-
terest. On the contrary, risk is taken into consideration where it 
occurs - at the source i.e. among the cashflows to be estimated. 
In contrast to conventional procedures, depreciations and capital 
costs are also discounted at the rate of riskfree interest, as secure 
amounts are being dealt with. Within the planning framework, 
the methodological error conventional value contribution ratios 
make of using risk-adjusted capital costs by discounting risk-free 
components with the risk-adjusted interest is just about com-
pensated for. In the case of management pay conventional ratios 
tend to lead to under-investment, as profits achieved are com-
pared with risk-adjusted instead of risk-free capital costs. Value 
increasing projects are often not carried out because the lowest 
bar is set too high. ERIC‘s measuring of performance attempts 
to avoid erroneous assessments by allowing the actual ex post 
value developments achieved to be compared with a benchmark 
achieved ex post (e.g. average industry revenue achieved), which 
could have been achieved with comparable risk. Thus it is hoped 
that  environmental  influences  which  could  affect  the  perfor-
mance and distort the “true“ management performance can be 
blocked out to a large extent.
Velthuis  and Wesner  stress  the  advantage  of  ERIC  in  allow-
ing the separate consideration of risk and temporal structure, 
which makes risk as a discount for cashflow more transparent 
and in raising the risk consciousness of decision-makers in firms. 
Furthermore erroneous incentives in management pay and er-
roneous assessments within the framework of measuring perfor-
mance should be avoided. Even if ERIC still has to prove itself in 
practice, the workshop participants were at least given food for 
thought about the ratios used in the practice of value based man-
agement.                Matthias Gassert (University of Freiburg)
More  information  on  all  CFSseminars  can  be  found 
under  www.ifk-cfs.de  or  contact  Birgit  Pässler,   
Tel: +49 (0)69 798-30052, Email: paessler@ifk-cfs.de.
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Value Based Management Supported by Ratios: 
The Current Position and New Developments
Value Based Management supported by ratios was the subject of a CFSworkshop on September 13, 2005. Louis 
Velthuis of the University of Frankfurt und Peter Wesner of KPMG began by explaining those traditional and 
value based profitability ratios currently being applied in practice along with conventional value contribution 
ratios. Following that they presented ERIC (Earnings less Riskfree Interest Charge), a value contribution ratio 
devised by KPMG and Louis Velthuis. In contrast to conventional value contribution ratios, it links the method-
ological advantages of the adequate inclusion of value contributions, in particular with regard to management 
pay and measuring performance. 
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Eugene F. Fama – 
an Extraordinary Academic 
One of the highest cash prizes for outstanding achievements in the field of banking and capital market research 
saw its premiere in Frankfurt on October 6, 2005. The Center for Financial Studies and Frankfurt University pre-
sented the inaugural Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics. The first prizewinner of the award of 50,000 
euros is Eugene F. Fama, who was honored for his development of and research into the concept of market effi-
ciency.
Just as extraordinary as Fama’s outstanding research work was 
the path that took him to the world of economics. “I did not 
take a direct route into financial economics,” says the Robert 
R. McCormick Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, the 
holder of many honors already, about himself. Fama did not 
commence his studies with economic sciences. The man now 
regarded by leading financial market publications as a “legend 
in capital market research”, was initially much more interested 
in French philology.
Eugene F. Fama was born in Boston. His grandparents had im-
migrated to the USA from Sicily and his father was a trucker. 
Eugene F. Fama was the first member of his family to attend uni-
versity. Shortly before completing his undergraduate degree at 
Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, Eugene F. Fama dis-
covered his passion for economics. Fama was working for one of 
the professors at Tufts University. The professor had a “Beat the 
Market” service and tried to figure out trading rules to beat the 
market. The trading rules always worked when they were back-
tested on the historic dater. But once applied to a real trading 
program they stopped working. That, Fama says today, was the 
point in time when he became an efficient markets person. 
J. Ackermann, E. Fama, J. P. Krahnen at the award ceremony on October 6, 2005.35
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After  successfully  completing  his  undergraduate  degree,  Fa-
ma moved to the Graduate School of Business at Chicago Uni-
versity, where he completed his master’s degree and, in 1964, 
his Ph.D. in economics-finance. Fama’s dissertation had the tit-
le “The Behavior of Stock Market Prices”. Eugene F. Fama has 
always remained true to the University of Chicago – after his 
studies as Assistant Professor of Finance, then as Professor of 
Finance, and ultimately as the Robert R. McCormick Distingu-
ished Service Professor of Finance. Fama holds several honorary 
doctorates, and is also a member of the American Academy of 
Arts and Science, and of the American Finance Association.
Fama’s  market  efficiency  hypothesis  thematizes  the  speed  in 
which new information is reflected in stock prices. Once all the 
available information is included in the pricing at any one time, 
investors can no longer systematically attain a higher return. 
Prices then rise with the same probability that they will fall. In 
Fama’s opinion not even the best stock analyst can outperform 
an efficient market in the long term without insider information. 
Fama goes one step further, however. In line with his “random 
walk theory”, price developments do not follow any pattern or 
trend. Previous price movements cannot be used to predict futu-
re prices therefore. In numerous empirical studies Fama has been 
able to substantiate his – often controversial – theses.
Eugene F. Fama is not only one of the most productive and 
most-cited financial market experts, but is also considered an 
outstanding windsurfer. At the age of 66 Fama still gets on his 
surfboard even in extreme wind conditions. “You have to ha-
ve something worth dying for,” he replies when asked about 
his hobby. His wife and he regularly spend the winters in their 
house near Malibu, close to the Californian beach. Practically 
enough, two of his children live in Chicago, two in California. 
Fama does not intend to retire in the foreseeable future as his 
work is still a source of “much too much pleasure”.
Felizitas Thom 
(CFS staff)
In honor of the prizewinner there was a 
CFSsymposium on the topic “Market Ef-
ficiency Today” prior to the presentation 
of the award on October 6, 2005. Re-
nowned  financial  economists  discussed 
the significance of Fama’s theses against 
the current background. 
Nouriel Roubini from New York Uni-
versity  analyzed  the  role  of  economic 
policy for market efficiency. He refer-
red to the increasing number of finan-
cial  crises  in  recent  decades,  both  in 
industrialized nations and in less deve-
loped economies. Often, a whole range 
of economic sectors, particularly in the 
emerging markets, is affected by a com-
bination  of  monetary,  banking,  corpo-
rate and sovereign debt crises. Roubini 
emphasized that the so-called asset price 
bubbles, observed in all country groups, 
are distinct indications of market ineffi-
ciency: They arise from self-fulfilling ex-
pectations; when they burst, they often 
have considerable negative impact on fi-
nancial markets and the real economy.
On the whole, Roubini identified three 
policy fields that are important for in-
creasing  market  efficiency  and  allevia-
ting  financial  crises:  monetary  policy, 
which should react also to rising asset 
bubbles, financial supervision, to impro-
ve the risk management of debtors and 
creditors, and international financial in-
stitutions, as a lender of last resort in the 
event of a crisis.
In  his  comments,  Marcel  Fratzscher 
of the European Central Bank addressed 
the complex relationship between finan-
cial  markets  and  economic  policy.  He 
stressed their mutual significance, yet al-
so pointed out the limited effectiveness 
of political control on internationally in-
tegrated financial markets. In particular, 
policy itself causes market inefficiencies 
all  too  often. Therefore,  he  concluded 
that the main focus should be on trans-
parency,  information  provision,  and  a 
stable political environment.
Eric  Ghysels  from  the  University  of 
North Carolina looked in his speech at 
market  efficiency  from  the  stance  of 
empirical financial market research. In 
accordance with the fundamental valu-
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ation equation, the value of stock and 
shares corresponds to the expected va-
lue of the cash flows, weighted with a 
factor  which  includes  investor  prefe-
rences. This valuation equation may not 
be reconciled with the so-called “equity 
premium puzzle”, however: On the mar-
kets it is possible to observe average an-
nual returns of around 7 percent for the 
stock market and 1 percent for the bond 
market. While it is accepted wisdom in 
financial  market  research  that  greater 
risk is rewarded with higher returns, for 
the valuation difference to be consistent 
with the fundamental valuation equation, 
the financial market players would have 
to be extremely reluctant to take risks 
– much more reluctant than observed in 
experiments conducted separately.
Ghysels argued that numerous works ha-
ve been published in recent years with 
the goal of solving the equity premium 
puzzle in which academics have shifted 
away  from  the  assumption  that  homo-
genous  expectations  dominate  on  the 
market or that there is such a thing as 
a  representative  investor  with  rational 
expectations.  On  the  basis  of  empiri-
cal tests Eric Ghysels demonstrated that 
the existence of heterogonous agents, as 
well as model insecurity, is relevant for 
the  valuation  of  stocks. The  degree  of 
model insecurity can in part better ex-
plain the returns attained on the capital 
market than the risks traditionally consi-
dered relevant to a valuation.
Hashem  Pesaran  from  the  Univer-
sity  of  Cambridge  discussed  the  Effi-
cient  Market  Hypothesis  (EMH)  from 
the market perspective. Recent studies 
have arrived at the conclusion that the 
EMH is unsustainable: Stock returns are 
predictable to some degree by means of 
a  variety  of  macroeconomic  variables. 
Eugene F. Fama therefore formulated a 
weaker version of the EMH: Prices re-
flect information up to the point where 
marginal benefits in acting on informati-
on and marginal costs are identical. But 
this makes the task of testing the EMH 
even  more  complicated  as  it  requires 
models that allow for heterogeneous in-
formation and transaction costs. Addi-
tionally, beating the market as a test of 
market efficiency also raises new chal-
lenges because it could be argued that 
such tests are carried out with the bene-
fit of hindsight.
The basic premises of the EMH are rati-
onality of investors, absence of arbitrage 
and collective rationality. According to 
Pesaran,  the  hypothesis  of  rational  ex-
pectations is unlikely to hold at all times: 
On the one hand, there may be major 
departures in periods of turmoil; on the 
other hand, herding behavior can lead to 
violations of rational behavior. 
As it is furthermore difficult in praxis 
to separate market inefficiencies from 
risk-adequate  compensation,  it  might 
not be helpful to focus on the develop-
ment of new tests in the future. Instead, 
future research should concentrate on 
the  limits  of  individual  and  collective 
rationality, and in doing so it should in-
clude findings from other areas of re-
search  as  already  done  in  behavioral 
finance.
For  Lawrence  E.  Harris  of  the  Uni-
versity of Southern California the Effi-
cient Market Hypothesis is a regularity 
enforced by well-informed speculators. 
Market efficiency determines price le-
vels.  A  similar  regularity  governs  the 
provision  of  liquidity.  Liquidity  plays 
the decisive role in the price adjustment 
processes.  Permanent  price  impact  is 
due to changes in value. Therefore the 
price impact resulting from the reconci-
liation of supply and demand is only per-
manent if the change in price has been 
caused by informed trading.
E. Ghysels, L. E. Harris and H. Pesaran37
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Transitory price impact is due to trans-
action  costs,  bluffing,  and  uninformed 
trading. The greater the price impact due 
to surplus supply or demand, the greater 
are the liquidity costs. The liquidity costs 
have to be paid by uninformed and impa-
tient market participants.
“Bluffing  strategies”  try  to  profit  from 
unstable market liquidity. If the price im-
pacts per unit traded differ for buy and 
sell orders, bluffers can profit. Therefore 
they try to fool traders into offering li-
quidity unwisely. 
A  typical  approach  is:  First  acquire  a 
large position quietly while having little 
impact on price. Subsequently push pri-
ces loudly up, perhaps following positive 
news whose significance foolish traders 
could misinterpret. Finally sell the posi-
tion at a profit when others follow. 
Dealers and other traders who supply 
liquidity  must  carefully  regulate  their 
trading to avoid loses to bluffing strate-
gies. Discipline from bluffers ultimately 
enforces liquidity efficiency. 
Automated trading algorithms and mo-
mentum traders are most vulnerable to 
bluffers because bluffing strategies func-
tion if market players believe transito-
ry price effects to be a permanent price 
effect. This is the dark side of the Effi-
ciency Market Hypothesis. According to 
Harris many large traders claim that they 
are “pure traders.” They test “market re-
solve” and so to speak identify “weakness 
in confidence.” This is essentially a bluf-
fing strategy.
Strategies which try to profit from inef-
ficiencies, however, discipline the mar-
ket participants and provide efficiency. 
The  market  efficiency  determines  the 
price level; the liquidity efficiency de-
termines the price adjustment proces-
ses.
Eugene F. Fama defended his Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. He sees the biggest 
support for his model in an observation 
of the profits of professional investment 
managers. Their profits are not particu-
larly good.
Responding to the presentations he agreed 
that there was no equity premium puzzle. 
“Who do you know that would hold equ-
ities at a premium of 1 or 11⁄2 percent? I 
do not know anybody”, he said. Fama hea-
vily disagreed to Roubini’s presentation: 
“Statistically I do not see any evidence of 
bubbles or any evidence of overshooting.” 
Talks  about  the  internet  bubble  would 
drive him crazy. “I do not think anybody 
can identify bubbles.” In line with Marcel 
Fratzscher he stressed the limited effec-
tiveness of political control on interna-
tionally integrated financial markets. He 
concluded that policy people should not 
intervene in the markets.
Susanne Bröck, Thorsten Freihube,   
Christian Offermanns, Christian Wilde   
(all University of Frankfurt) 38
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Jan Pieter Krahnen, CFS Director and 
chairman  of  the  jury  for  the  Deut-
sche  Bank  Prize  in  Financial  Econo-
mics 2005 
“The ideas put forward by Eugene F. Fama 
have made a decisive contribution to our un-
derstanding  of  information  processing  and 
price movements on the capital markets. His 
insights have had and continue to exert the most remarkable impact on fi-
nancial management. Thus Fama‘s work also defines the very high stan-
dards that shall be associated with the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial 
Economics. The objective is to develop the prize into one of the most renow-
ned awards in financial economics .”
Hermann  Remsperger,  Member  of 
the  Board  of  Deutsche  Bundesbank 
and member of the jury for the Deut-
sche  Bank  Prize  in  Financial  Econo-
mics 2005
“Deutsche  Bundesbank  is  obliged  to  ensure 
monetary stability and the stability of the fi-
nancial system. It makes this key contribution 
to economic policy on the basis of well-founded academic findings. Against 
this background I was not lacking in motivation to be a member of a jury 
with the honor of selecting an academic who has made a pioneering cont-
ribution in the field of financial economics. In Professor Eugene F. Fama we 
are honoring an economist who has fundamentally shaped our stance to-
wards financial markets, and thus at the same time contributed greatly to a 
practical policy of stability.”
Josef  Ackermann,  Chairman  of  the 
Board of Deutsche Bank AG 
“Professor Fama has opened up new dimensions 
in international financial sciences. He must 
take the credit for elevating our understan-
ding of the financial markets into new sphe-
res. Professor Fama can look back on nearly 40 
years of successful research work. In this peri-
od he has – thanks to his insatiable curiosity and his active examination of 
real market phenomena – consistently challenged existing findings and their 
possible explanations. The speed and force with which his theoretical and em-
pirical research has been included in practical work is quite remarkable. This 
is precisely the kind of knowledge transfer that financial institutes need, and 
which we at Deutsche Bank intend to assist and encourage.”
“The Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics is an important contribu-
tion to strengthening Frankfurt as a financial and business location, and is 
an indication of the new quality in the global partnership between practice 
and research.” 
Rudolf Steinberg, President of the Uni-
versity of Frankfurt 
“The  governing  board  of  Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe  University  Frankfurt  am  Main  is 
proud to award – together with the Center for 
Financial Studies – the ‘inaugural’ Deutsche 
Bank Prize in Financial Economics, one of the 
world’s most significant prizes for financial 
economics. The presentation of the award at Frankfurt University shows that 




ned the Center 
for  Financial 
Studies  in  Sep-
tember  2005. 
She  is  also  en-
rolled as a Ph.D. 
candidate in Finance at Tilburg Universi-
ty. She holds a BA degree in Economics 
from  Istanbul  University,  an  MBA  de-
gree from Yeditepe University in Istanbul 
and an M.Phil. degree in Finance from 
CentER at Tilburg University. Previously 
she worked for several years as an equity 
analyst in Turkey. 
Günseli’s  research  interests  are  in  the 
area of empirical banking. She has wor-
ked on the impact of government‘s bor-
rowing needs on banks’ lending behavior 
changes. At CFS, she is working on Ger-
man financial institutions, including bank 
relationships,  concentration  of  borro-
wing and role of state ownership under 
the  supervision  of  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen 
and Steven Ongena.39
Timetable for forthcoming events 2005/2006
CFScolloquium series 2005
Basel II und die Konsequenzen für  
das Risikomanagement / Basel II and 
its Impact on Risk Management
TBC    Dr. Helmut Perlet, Mitglied des Vorstands
CFSexecutive development
Bilanzierung von Finanzinstrumenten 
nach HGB, IAS und US-GAAP (2 days) 
Prof. Dr. Martin Glaum  
(Universität Gießen)
Volker Thier (KPMG)
Kreditderivate, ABS und ihre 
Einsatzmöglichkeiten im 
Kreditrisikomanagement (3 days)
Prof. Dr. Günter Franke  
(Universität Konstanz)
Prof. Dr. Dirk Jens F. Nonnen-
macher (DZ BANK AG)
Nov. 17/18 2005
Nov. 24-26. 2005
For further information and registration on all CFSseminars  
please contact Birgit Pässler, Tel.: +49 (0)69 798-30052,  
Fax: +49 (0)69 798-30077, Email: paessler@ifk-cfs.de
CFScolloquium series 2006
Unternehmensverfassung im Wandel/ 
Corporate Governance in Transition
We look forward to welcome: 
Klaus-Peter Müller 
(Sprecher des Vorstands, Commerzbank AG)
Dr. Thomas R. Fischer 
(Vorsitzender des Vorstands, WestLB)
Dr. Wolfgang Mansfeld 
(Mitglied des Vorstands, Union Asset Management  
Holding AG)
Max Dietrich Kley 
(Mitglied des Aufsichtsrats, BASF AG)
Dr. Jürgen Heraeus  
(Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats, Haereus Holding GmbH)
Admission to the lectures of the CFScolloquium is only possible after 
registration. Interested parties who do not receive Email information 
regularly may contact Birgit Pässler, Tel. +49 (0)69 798-30052 or 
Email: paessler@ifk-cfs.de
CFSresearch conferences
Nov. 18/19 2005    Third RICAFE Conference - “Entrepre-
neurship, Risk Capital and the Financing 
of Innovative Firms” in Turin 
Organization: Marco Da Rin (Turin 
University), Marina Di Giacomo (Tu-
rin University), Giovanna Nicodano 
(Turin University), Alessandro Sem-
benelli (Turin University)
Dec. 2/3 2005    DSGE Modelling at Policymaking Institu-
tions: Progress and Prospects 
Organization: Matthew Canzoneri 
(BMW Center for German and Eu-
ropean Studies at Georgetown Uni-
versity), Dale Henderson (Federal 
Reserve Board), Gian Maria Milesi-
Ferretti (IMF), Lucrezia Reichlin 
(ECB), Volker Wieland (University of 
Frankfurt and CFS)
Mar. 15 2006    Behavioral Finance and Investment 
Mangement (TBC)
    Organization: BSI GAMMA 
Foundation, CFS
Nov. 17/18 2006    Public versus Private Ownership of Finan-
cial Institutions 
Organization: Franklin Allen (Uni-
versity of Pensylvania and WFIC), 
Elena Carletti (CFS), Jan Pieter  
Krahnen (University of Frankfurt 
and CFS), Thilo Liebig (Deutsche 
Bundesbank), Beatrice Weder (Mainz 
University and CFS)
For further information and registration please consult  
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